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Governments should embrace randomized trials to estimate the efficacy of 
different laws and regulations.  Just as random assignment of treatments is the 
most powerful method of testing for the causal impact of pharmaceuticals, ran-
domly assigning individuals or firms to different legal rules can help resolve 
uncertainty about the consequential impacts of law.  In this Article, we explain 
why randomized testing is likely to produce better information than nonrandom 
evaluation of legal policies.  We then offer guidelines for conducting legal exper-
imentation successfully, considering a variety of obstacles, including ethical 
ones.  Randomization will not be useful for all policies, but once government 
gains better experience with randomization, administrative agencies should pre-
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sumptively issue randomization impact statements justifying decisions to im-
plement particular policies.  Making the content of law partially contingent on 
the results of randomized trials will promote ex ante bipartisan agreements, as 
politicians with different empirical predictions will tend to think that the expe-
riments will support their position. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Legal scholars have debated the impacts of government policy for 
millenia.  In 81 B.C., Chinese scholars argued about the desirability 
of monopolies in the salt and iron industries in a succession of essays 
and public debates.1  These debates were theoretical—with scholars 
predicting the positive and negative effects of monopolies as com-
pared to a competitive market.  Over two thousand years later, theo-
retical debates over policies remain the norm.  But theory alone can-
not resolve many policy issues because different theories point in 
different directions.  Scholars attempt to inform these debates by 
parsing historical data, but regression analysis of policy is fraught 
with complications.  There is little policy variation on many topics of 
national importance, and the variation that does exist is correlated 
with many other factors.  Empirical policy evaluation often resembles 
a drug study in which the experimental population does not receive 
an assigned treatment and instead gets to choose whether to take the 
medicine or the placebo.   
Policymakers and commentators frequently refer loosely to new 
laws and legal institutions as “experiments,”2 but in contrast to medi-
cal experimentation,3 these innovations rarely randomly designate 
treatment and control groups.  There have been a handful of excep-
tions since 1968, including randomized “social experiments” that were 
 
1 See A. de G., The Scholar as Government Consultant:  The Great Salt and Iron Debate in 
Ancient China, 8 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 4, 4-6 (1965). 
2 See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Reconceptualizing Property in Designs, 25 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1105, 1151 (2008) (referring to a statute providing intellectual prop-
erty protection for vessel hulls as a “legal experiment”); Theodor Meron, Reflections on 
the Prosecution of War Crimes by International Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 551, 551 (2006) 
(referring to the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes tribunals as “a bold legal experi-
ment”). See generally Alan Milner, Restatement:  The Failure of a Legal Experiment, 20 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 795 (1959) (characterizing Restatements of the Law as a failed experiment).  
The most prominent academic account of experimental approaches to government also 
defines experimentation broadly, mentioning randomization as a possible ingredient of 
experimentation only once.  See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of 
Democratic Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 348 (1998) (noting that systems for 
evaluating experiments “can themselves be benchmarked, and . . . can be combined 
with random-assignment experiments and other familiar methods of evaluation”). 
3 For a historical discussion of the introduction of randomization into the statis-
tical analysis of medicine, see Tar Timothy Chen, History of Statistical Thinking in Medi-
cine, in ADVANCED MEDICAL STATISTICS 3, 11-14 (Ying Lu & Ji-Qian Fang eds., 2003).  
See also R.A. Fisher, The Arrangement of Field Experiments, 33 J. MINISTRY AGRIC. GR. BRIT. 
503, 506-07 (1926) (suggesting the use of random trials in agricultural field experi-
mentation because “[o]ne way of making sure that a valid estimate of error will be ob-
tained is to arrange the plots deliberately at random so that no distinction can creep in 
between pairs of plots treated alike and pairs treated differently”). 
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performed to assess the impact of government policies.4  But the legal 
literature has virtually ignored them.  Legal scholars have discussed 
the results of particular social experiments,5 and they have com-
mented occasionally that additional social experiments could provide 
useful information in one field or another.6  But these legal scholars 
have not addressed the normative question of whether the legal sys-
tem should generally seek to incorporate experimental methods, and 
if so, what approaches the legal system should take to maximize the 
chance that experiments will improve policy. 
Perhaps as a partial result of this scholarly neglect, past social  
experiments have clustered in specific policy areas.  As the label “so-
cial experimentation” suggests, most of the experiments have been in 
the area of social services, testing whether expenditures on entitle-
ments succeed in achieving social goals, such as reducing poverty.7  
For example, a recent experiment executed under a Medicare statute 
requiring randomized testing of programs8 assessed whether telephone 
 
4 A doctoral student, Heather Ross, developed the idea for an experiment on the 
effect of a negative income tax and then received governmental funding for her exper-
iment.  The experimental results are reported in three volumes.  See generally DAVID 
KERSHAW & JERILYN FAIR, 1 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT:  OP-
ERATIONS, SURVEYS, AND ADMINISTRATION (1976); 2 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-
MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT:  LABOR-SUPPLY RESPONSES (Harold W. Watts & Albert 
Rees eds., 1977); 3 THE NEW JERSEY INCOME-MAINTENANCE EXPERIMENT:  EXPENDI-
TURES, HEALTH, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; AND THE QUALITY OF THE EVIDENCE (Harold 
W. Watts & Albert Rees eds., 1977).  For useful summaries of the experiment, see DA-
VID GREENBERG ET AL., SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION AND PUBLIC POLICYMAKING 111-64 
(2003); Frank P. Stafford, Income-Maintenance Policy and Work Effort:  Learning from Exper-
iments and Labor-Market Studies, in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 95, 111 tbl.3.5 ( Jerry A. 
Hausman & David A. Wise eds., 1985). 
5 See, e.g., Machaela M. Hoctor, Comment, Domestic Violence as a Crime Against the 
State:  The Need for Mandatory Arrest in California, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 643, 655-57 (1997) 
(commenting on a Minneapolis experiment, in which police, assuming probable 
cause, assigned at random the arrest of alleged domestic violence perpetrators, and 
noting that suspects who were arrested had the lowest rate of recidivism). 
6 See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt, Post-Modern Meditations on Punishment:  On the Lim-
its of Reason and the Virtues of Randomization (A Polemic and Manifesto for the Twenty-
First Century), 74 SOC. RES. 307, 328-30 (2007) (proposing randomization in several 
areas, such as criminal justice, where it could be used to set the length of prison sen-
tences); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules:  A Proposal for Restricted Field Expe-
riments, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 67, 72-77 (proposing randomized 
experiments on rules of civil procedure). 
7 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 26 (“[M]ost social experiment test pro-
grams are targeted at persons or families who are somehow disadvantaged, particularly 
in terms of having low incomes.”). 
8 Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 
§ 721(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 1395b-8(b)(1) (2006) (requiring “development, testing, and 
evaluation of chronic care improvement programs using randomized controlled trials”). 
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contact by nurses to at-risk Medicare patients would reduce program 
costs.9  Another class of randomized studies evaluated criminal justice 
policies.10  A rare exception to these two areas has been a set of exper-
iments on electricity pricing.11  Experiments have almost never varied 
the legal rights and obligations of ordinary citizens or entities in areas 
such as securities law or taxation.12  Instead, experiments have focused 
on the possible provision of new services or on those who might be 
thought of as forfeiting rights by committing crimes. 
This Article advances the case for randomizing law, including the 
legal rights and obligations expressed in statutes and regulations.13  
Randomized experiments have the potential not only to be govern-
mentally funded academic exercises, but also to serve as integral com-
ponents of the legal process.  In this Article, we argue that govern-
ment should embrace randomized trials of statutes and regulations as 
a tool for testing the effectiveness of those laws.  Just as random as-
signment of treatments is the most powerful method of testing for the 
causal impact of pharmaceuticals, random assignment of individuals, 
firms, or jurisdictions to different legal rules can help resolve uncer-
tainty about the consequences of laws and regulations. 
Beyond endorsing randomized legal experimentation in areas 
where such experiments have not generally been contemplated, this 
Article considers how the policy process should change to accommo-
date randomized experimentation.  Administrative law, we argue, 
 
9 See NANCY MCCALL ET AL., RTI INT’L, EVALUATION OF PHASE 1 OF MEDICARE 
HEALTH SUPPORT (FORMERLY VOLUNTARY CHRONIC CARE IMPROVEMENT) PILOT PRO-
GRAM UNDER TRADITIONAL FEE-FOR-SERVICE MEDICARE 1-5 (2007) (reporting prelim-
inary results of the programs); Reed Abelson, Medicare Finds How Hard It Is to Save 
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2008, at A1 (describing one such program).  
10 See generally David P. Farrington & Brandon C. Welsh, A Half Century of Rando-
mized Experiments on Crime and Justice, 34 CRIME & JUST. 55 (2006) (providing an over-
view of randomized criminal justice experiments from 1957 to 2004).  
11 See Dennis J. Aigner, The Residential Electricity Time-of-Use Pricing Experiments:  What 
Have We Learned? (“The purpose of the present paper is to consider the empirical re-
sults available so far from the DOE experiments in light of design and analysis con-
cerns . . . .”), in SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 4, at 11, 12; see also 1 RESEARCH 
TRIANGLE INST., ANALYTICAL MASTER PLAN FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE DATA FROM THE 
ELECTRIC UTILITY RATE DEMONSTRATION PROJECTS 1 (1978) (analyzing projects de-
signed to “evaluate experimentally the effects of time-of-use pricing of electricity for 
residential customers”).  
12 For an exception that we propose to extend, see infra subsection IV.C.1.a. 
13 The possibility that judge-made legal rules could be subjected to randomized 
testing is beyond the scope of this Article.  Such testing could be implemented by legis-
latures to the extent that statutes can preempt common law rulemaking.  But, more 
speculatively, one might imagine courts themselves conducting prospective randomized 
control experiments to gather evidence on the most appropriate resolution in a case. 
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should accept decisions by agencies to randomize policies and perhaps 
even be more deferential to policy decisions made after a process of 
experimentation.  Ultimately, the executive branch could make forma-
lized consideration of randomized control trials as central to the regu-
latory process as formalized consideration of the costs and benefits of 
regulations.  If experimentation begins to occur with sufficient fre-
quency in agencies, Congress or other legislatures might themselves 
initiate experiments more frequently.  The possibility of experimenta-
tion may reduce legislative disagreement.  Where disagreements are 
truly empirical, partisans on both sides of an issue may believe that 
they would benefit from experimentation.  A self-executing experi-
ment can, in effect, serve to resolve a bet among competing legislative 
factions, with the experimental outcome automatically affecting the 
content of the legislation.  Meanwhile, if a legal culture of randomiza-
tion developed sufficiently, a legislator’s refusal to endorse an experi-
ment might be interpreted as evidence that the legislator’s empirical 
claims about a policy mask some other agenda. 
The Article proceeds as follows.  Part I lays out the affirmative case 
for randomized control trials and describes our central proposal.  Part 
II describes the problems of nonrandom evaluation of legal policies.  
Conventional regression analysis is subject to problems, including 
omitted variable bias, publication bias, and misspecification.  Part III 
discusses potential problems and pitfalls of randomized policy expe-
riments, as well as responses to these complications.  Some of these 
problems involve challenges of interpreting even randomized legal 
experiments, though, in general, randomization should make inter-
pretation somewhat easier.  The more challenging problems from the 
perspective of policy implementation are that randomized legal policy 
may be costly or raise ethical concerns.  Finally, Part IV offers some 
guidelines for legal experimentation, including specific recommen-
dations for legislatures and administrative agencies, and it then de-
scribes specific applications in which randomization seems especially 
likely to be fruitful. 
I.  THE POWER OF RANDOMIZED CONTROLS 
The idea that randomization could be used to create a quality 
control group has existed since 1925, when Ronald Fisher, the father 
of modern statistics, suggested using random assignments in research 
involving agricultural trials that arose out of his work at the Ro-
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thamsted Experimental Station.14  In his 1935 book, The Design of Expe-
riments, Fisher explained the power of the technique with the arresting 
example of a “[l]ady [who] declares that by tasting a cup of tea made 
with milk she can discriminate whether the milk or the tea infusion 
was first added to the cup.”15  Fisher proposed mixing eight cups of 
tea—four with milk first and four with milk last—and “presenting 
them to the subject for judgment in a random order.”16 
Intentionally interjecting uncertainty into the experimental design 
could have the perverse effect of enhancing the ability of a researcher 
to control the experiment.  As David Harrington has noted, 
 [i]n one of the delightful ironies of modern science, the randomized 
trial “adjusts” for both observed and unobserved heterogeneity in a con-
trolled experiment by introducing chance variation into the study  
design.  If interventions for patients are chosen by chance, then the law 
of large numbers implies that the average values of patient characteris-
tics should be roughly equal in the intervention groups.
17
  
Randomization itself produces the controlled environment in which a 
similar group may provide a source of comparison.  Of course, ran-
domization does not mean that the control and treatment groups will 
be identical.  If we looked at, for example, the heights of people in 
each group, we would see the normally distributed bell curve.  But the 
point is that we would see similarly shaped bell curves of heights in 
both groups.  The law of large numbers assures that as the size of the 
group increases, the mean of both groups will both converge on the 
population mean.  But random assignment means that beyond the 
mean, the distribution of both groups with regard to every characteris-
tic (save the treatment itself) will become increasingly identical as the 
sample size increases.  Instead of trying to establish identical control 
pairs—which on a pair-wise basis are identical on every nontreatment 
dimension—random assignment creates groups that have statistically 
similar distributions on every nontreatment dimension.  Since the dis-
tribution of height (or any other characteristic) is the same in both 
 
14 See R.A. FISHER, 3 STATISTICAL METHODS FOR RESEARCH WORKERS 203-09 (1925) 
(describing this experiment); see also IAN AYRES, SUPER CRUNCHERS 46-80 (2007) (dis-
cussing the power of randomization as a tool for business and the government). 
15 RONALD A. FISHER, THE DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 11 (Hafner Publ’g Co., 6th ed. 
1951) (1935). 
16 Id.  
17 David P. Harrington, The Randomized Clinical Trial, 95 J. AM. STAT. ASS’N 312, 
312 (2000). 
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the control and the treatment groups, we can attribute any differences 
in the average group response to the difference in treatment.18 
Fisher’s breakthrough was realizing that randomization could do a 
better job of producing a controlled experiment than would non-
randomized controls.  Fisher went so far as to argue that randomiza-
tion produced better controls than could ever be achieved by physic-
ally matching the nontested attributes.  In discussing his “Lady and 
the Tea” problem, Fisher explained: 
 It is no sufficient remedy to insist that “all the cups must be exactly 
alike” in every respect except that to be tested.  For this is a totally im-
possible requirement in our example, and equally in all other forms of exper-
imentation.  In practice it is possible that the cups will differ perceptibly 
in the thickness or smoothness of their material, that the quantities of 
milk added to the different cups will not be exactly equal, that the 
strength of the infusion of tea may change between pouring the first and 
the last cup, and that the temperature also at which the tea is tasted will 
change during the course of the experiment.
19
  
For Fisher, some attributes of an experiment were beyond a res-
earcher’s ability to physically control through experimental design.  
Some causal attributes, for example, may not be observable.  But ran-
domization as a control assures that sufficiently large control and 
treatment groups will be similar even with regard to attributes that are 
unobservable to the researcher. 
The earliest formal randomized drug trial on humans took place in 
the late 1940s, when Austin Bradford Hill ran the first clinical trial test-
ing the effectiveness of the antibiotic streptomycin in treating tubercu-
losis.20  By 1962, the use of random controlled trials had become so 
prevalent that Congress amended the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to 
mandate the use of “adequate and well-controlled investigations, in-
cluding clinical investigations, by experts qualified by scientific training 
and experience to evaluate the effectiveness of the drug involved.”21  
 
18 For more information on the logic of clinical trials, see generally id. 
19 FISHER, supra note 15, at 18 (emphasis added). 
20 For more information about the trial and its methodology, see Streptomycin in 
Tuberculosis Trials Comm., Med. Research Council, Streptomycin Treatment of Pulmonary 
Tuberculosis, 2 BMJ 769 (1948). 
21 Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 102(c), 76 Stat. 780, 781 (1962) (codified as amended at 21 
U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006)). See generally Karen Baswell, Note, Time for a Change:  Why the 
FDA Should Require Greater Disclosure of Differences of Opinion on the Safety and Efficacy of Ap-
proved Drugs, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1799, 1832 (2007) (arguing for “increased transpar-
ency and disclosure from the pharmaceutical and pharmaceutical research industries”). 
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Since 1970, randomized clinical trials have been a critical part of the 
U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s analysis of applications.22 
Given the considerable benefits of randomized policy experiments, 
we propose that the government systematize and expand experimenta-
tion.  Before enacting legislation, legislators should consider conduct-
ing an experiment of the new policy.  Administrators should also adopt 
widespread experimentation.  Just as cost-benefit analyses and “envi-
ronmental impact statements” (EIS) are necessary steps in the forma-
tion of numerous regulations and policies,23 so too should “randomiza-
tion impact statements” (RIS) become part of the policy planning 
landscape.  Randomized studies should not be an absolute prerequisite 
for legal change.  A norm to randomize or explain why randomization 
could not be undertaken, however, would help discipline regulators to 
take evidence-based lawmaking more seriously.  Whenever a new regu-
lation is put forward, the relevant agency should be presumptively  
required to present an RIS with the contents described in this Part.  
We discuss later the details of implementation (including when an 
 
22 See Abigail Alliance for Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschen-
bach, 495 F.3d 695, 697, 706 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (considering whether 
“terminally ill patients [have] a right of access to experimental drugs that have passed 
limited safety trials but have not been proven safe and effective” and noting that 
“‘[t]he history of the effectiveness requirement in drug regulation is inextricably 
linked to the advent of the randomized, controlled clinical trial as the cornerstone of 
medical research’” (quoting Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the “Gold Standard” 
for New Drug Approval?  Redefining “Substantial Evidence” in the FDA Modernization Act of 
1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 131 (1999))); 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5) (2010) (de-
scribing the required presentation of controlled and uncontrolled clinical trials in an 
application for FDA approval); see also Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the 
Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices:  Perspectives on Private Certification and 
Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 889 (1996) (suggesting a plan to delegate some of 
the FDA’s regulatory authority to private bodies in order to increase efficiency); cf. 
40 C.F.R. § 799.9420(d)(1)(iv)(D) (2009) (mandating randomized testing of toxic 
substances in rodents).  
23 The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006), 
requires an EIS for any “major Federal action[] significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”  The purpose of the EIS is to improve agency decisionmaking by 
requiring “detailed information concerning significant environmental impacts.”  Rob-
ertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989).  Executive Order 
Number 12,866 states that “[i]n deciding whether and how to regulate, agencies 
should assess all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives, including the 
alternative of not regulating.”  Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), re-
printed as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006).  “The objectives of this Executive Order are 
to enhance planning and coordination . . . to reaffirm the primacy of Federal agencies 
in the regulatory decision-making process; to restore the integrity and legitimacy of 
regulatory review and oversight; and to make the process more accessible and open to 
the public.” Id. at 638.  
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agency may proceed to regulate without an RIS).24  The new norm, 
however, should be the presentation of data from a randomized policy 
experiment. 
II.  THE PROBLEMS OF NONRANDOM EVALUATION 
This Part explores the advantages of randomized studies by  
reviewing recurring weaknesses in alternative modes of evaluation.  
This analysis responds to an anticipated counterargument—that ran-
domized studies are unnecessary—because statistical and econometric 
techniques can be used to estimate policy effects reliably.  Even when 
the most advanced techniques are employed, however, nonrandom 
analyses will generally leave more uncertainty than random analyses.  
Any statutory change is experimental in that it creates a new legal re-
gime, allowing comparison to the world under the prior regime.  In-
deed, it is common for proponents and neutral commentators to de-
scribe such a change as “an experiment.”25  Effects, however, can be 
difficult to assess because there may be alternative explanations for 
any observed changes.  Some legal changes are sufficiently drastic, 
and the responses to them sufficiently immediate and profound, that 
it is possible to link cause and effect.  But reasonable observers often 
disagree about causality.  And even if reasonable, sophisticated parties 
would agree, partisans may offer misleading interpretations of the da-
ta.  The media may then summarize the debate by simply noting that 
experts disagree.26  Those who do not have the time, inclination, or 
ability to probe the evidence cannot then easily discern the truth.27 
As the number of jurisdictions trying an experiment rises, the data 
may become clearer.  But even then, the challenges of statistical analy-
sis may make it difficult to reach confident conclusions.  Statistical 
correlations between new policies and other variables need not imply 
causation.  It will thus almost always be relatively easy for partisans to 
find some basis on which to develop misleading theories or else to of-
fer critiques of relatively robust results.  This Part explains why, even 
using data from numerous jurisdictions, the technique of convent-
 
24 See infra Section IV.B. 
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
26 See Bryan Keefer, Tsunami, COLUM. JOURNALISM REV., July–Aug. 2004, at 18, 18-
23 (discussing reporters’ reluctance to take sides on issues of public controversy dur-
ing elections). 
27 Cf. Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process, 107 YALE 
L.J. 1535, 1552-53 (1998) (describing a similar problem when judges and jurors try to 
assess scientific evidence beyond their competence). 
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ional multiple regression analysis, in which the policy of interest forms 
an independent variable, may produce inaccurate results.  This Part, 
of course, is not intended to provide a comprehensive examination of 
the uses and limits of statistical analysis.28  Section II.B comments on 
the difficulties of improving the law by using the states as policy labor-
atories without randomization. 
A.  Conventional Regression Analysis 
1.  Omitted Variable Bias 
Correlation, introductory statistics students are told, does not  
imply causation.  The simplest example of this is the possibility of re-
verse causation.  For example, suppose that students who receive sex 
education have sex at an earlier age.29  This result could mean that 
sex education encourages students to have more sex, but it also could 
reflect the fact that school districts with high rates of student sexual 
activity respond to these rates by offering sex education.  Statisticians 
overcome this problem by adding control variables for the characte-
ristics of the students, such as family income, parents’ education, and 
religion, as well as for the characteristics of the community, such as 
whether it is rural or urban and the region of the country in which it 
is located.30  If those variables exhaust all nonrandom factors contri-
buting to community and family decisions about sex education, then 
the coefficient on the sex education variable would successfully 
represent the effect of random variation on whether students are ex-
posed to sex education.  But if there is an omitted variable that corre-
lates with both the community decision to offer sex education and 
the individual decision to have sex, the coefficient will be biased. 
Even careful researchers cannot easily avoid this problem (and it 
can be exploited by researchers who hope to establish a particular re-
sult).  There are at least two reasons it is difficult to avoid bias.  First, 
the available data may be incomplete.  Even if there are strong theo-
 
28 For a useful overview of regression analysis, see generally WILLIAM MENDENHALL 
& TERRY SINCICH, A SECOND COURSE IN STATISTICS:  REGRESSION ANALYSIS (6th ed. 
2003).  For a critical analysis of the use of empirical evidence in legal scholarship, see 
Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 14-19 (2002). 
29 For a study on the relationship between sexual activity and sex education, see 
Deborah Anne Dawson, The Effects of Sex Education on Adolescent Behavior, 18 FAMILY 
PLANNING PERSP. 162, 162 (1986).  
30 See, e.g., id. at 170 tbl.9 (listing control variables and their respective effects on 
the likelihood of premarital pregnancy). 
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retical reasons to believe that parental education is an important vari-
able, it may be impossible to develop a measure that fully accounts for 
the parents’ educational level.31  For example, a measure indicating 
whether someone’s mother graduated from high school would seem 
to imply that all high-school dropouts are alike and that all high-
school graduates are alike, but within each group there may be consi-
derable educational heterogeneity.  Even more precise data—
including information like parental GPAs—will be, at best, only crude 
proxies.  Second, the researchers’ theoretical accounts of which va-
riables correlate with the dependent and independent variables are 
likely to be incomplete. 
The omitted variable bias may be particularly problematic when 
regressions are used to analyze the behavior of individuals who have 
self-selected particular governmental programs.  For example, Julie 
Berry Cullen and others analyzed the effect of school-choice lotteries, 
whose winners would be allowed to attend particular schools.32  They 
noted that, according to some studies, students who won the school-
choice lotteries appeared to do better than students who did not enter 
the lotteries.33  Competing explanations for this result included that 
lottery winners were allowed to attend better schools and that more 
motivated students are likely to self-select into the lottery.34  In the ab-
sence of variables fully capturing student motivation, a regression 
would tend to inflate the apparent effects of the schools on student 
performance.  Indeed, the Cullen study showed that students who 
won the school-choice lotteries performed no better than students 
who entered but lost the same lotteries.35  So it was student motivation, 
and not school quality, that caused the difference in performance be-
tween school-lottery winners and nonlottery entrants.  Though not 
created for the purpose of facilitating data analysis, the lottery pro-
 
31 Dawson’s study used a binary variable indicating whether the mother had at 
least twelve years of education.  Id.  
32 Julie Berry Cullen et al., The Effect of School Choice on Student Outcomes:  Evidence from 
Randomized Lotteries (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10113, 2003). 
33 See id. at 1 (discussing such findings in previous observational studies). 
34 See id. (noting that the studies producing such results “suffer potentially from im-
portant selection bias since the students who take advantage of school choice are unlikely 
to be representative of students more generally”); see also, e.g., Caroline M. Hoxby & So-
nali Murarka, Methods of Assessing the Achievement of Students in Charter Schools 24  
(Sept. 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.vanderbilt.edu/ 
schoolchoice/conference/papers/Hoxby-Murarka_2006-DRAFT.pdf (noting possible 
variables that increase self-selection bias in students who apply to charter schools, such as 
“prior achievement” or “parental motivation”).   
35 Cullen et al., supra note 32, at 23. 
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duced random assignments that allowed the researchers to avoid 
omitted variable bias.36 
Even studies that attempt to control for all available information 
and seek to minimize the danger of omitted variable bias may nonethe-
less omit important variables.  This reality can be shown by comparing 
the results of randomized experiments with the results of nonrandom-
ized statistical analysis.  Paul Glewwe and others conducted separate 
prospective randomized and retrospective nonrandomized studies of 
whether making “flip charts”—large visual aids illustrating concepts in 
science, health, and mathematics—available to students in Kenya in-
creased test scores.37  The retrospective studies showed that flip charts 
increased test scores, while the randomized studies revealed no effect.38  
Even a difference-in-difference analysis gave misleading results, show-
ing that students in schools adopting flip charts performed especially 
well in flip-chart subjects relative to other subjects.39  The forces that 
lead jurisdictions or institutions to adopt policy changes, such as flip 
charts, may be so complex that omitted variables matter even when it is 
not obvious that any important variables are omitted. 
Some statistical techniques, such as instrumental-variable and re-
gression-discontinuity studies, seek to take advantage of naturally oc-
curring randomness.40  A full discussion of these techniques is beyond 
 
36 Hoxby & Murarka, supra note 34, at 24 (“[R]andomization over a large number of 
students who apply to a charter school eliminates all forms of self-selection bias . . . .”). 
37 Paul Glewwe et al., Retrospective vs. Prospective Analyses of School Inputs:  The Case of 
Flip Charts in Kenya (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8018, 2000). 
38 Id. at 18.  
39 See id. at 8 (concluding that “adding flip charts raises test scores by about 20 
percent of a standard deviation in flip-chart subjects”).  
40 Consider, for example, Steven Levitt’s attempt to determine the effect of police 
presence on crime.  See Steven D. Levitt, Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate 
the Effect of Police on Crime, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 270 (1997).  A regression simply using the 
change in the crime rate as a dependent variable and police presence as an indepen-
dent variable would produce a biased coefficient, because the choice of how many po-
lice to hire is “endogen[ous]” and may depend in part on expectations of whether 
crime is likely to increase.  Id. at 270.  Levitt developed a regression predicting the 
change in the number of police officers based on factors including whether a mayoral 
election was scheduled, id. at 277, and then substituted the predicted values from this 
regression for the variable directly measuring police presence.  Using the predicted 
change in police presence as an explanatory variable, rather than the actual change 
in police presence, allows the experimenters to isolate the effect of increased police 
presence attributable to what amounts to a random factor, the election-year calendar.  
See id. at 271 (noting that the “instrument employed” was “the timing of mayoral and 
gubernatorial elections”).  For another example of an instrumental-variables study, see 
Jonathan Klick & Alexander Tabarrok, Using Terror Alert Levels to Estimate the Effect of Po-
lice on Crime, 48 J.L. & ECON. 267 (2005), which uses terror-alert levels in Washington, 
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the scope of this Article, but these approaches are often inferior to 
randomized control trials.  With instrumental-variables studies, there 
may be some subjectivity in the choice of instruments.  Although there 
are statistical tests that can be used to assess the validity of instru-
ments,41 one can still argue about whether specific instruments are the 
best available.  Meanwhile, with regression-discontinuity studies, there 
may be some subjectivity in assessing whether groups on either side of 
a discontinuity are truly comparable.42  Casual empiricism, in any 
event, suggests that such studies require sufficient analytical judgment 
such that their improved statistical power may not translate to a great-
er likelihood that the findings will be accepted in the public policy 
process.  For example, a paper by Saurabh Bhargava and Vikram  
Pathania takes advantage of the discontinuity in cellular telephone 
rates around 9 p.m., “when cell phone providers systematically transi-
tion from ‘peak’ to ‘off-peak’ pricing.”43  Call volumes increase discon-
tinuously around the 9 p.m. threshold, but there has been no recent 
increase in car accidents immediately after 9 p.m. compared to the 
period before cell companies began to offer free calling after 9 p.m.44  
Nonetheless, policymakers have continued to proclaim driving while 
talking on a cell phone to be dangerous.45  Instrumental-variables and 
 
D.C., as an instrument because the city deployed more police when the alert levels 
were raised, even though the terror-alert levels would not be correlated to ordinary 
crime rates.  For an overview of regression-discontinuity studies, see Jinyong Hahn et 
al., Identification and Estimation of Treatment Effects with a Regression-Discontinuity Design, 
69 ECONOMETRICA 201 (2001).  An example of such a study is M. Keith Chen & Jesse 
M. Shapiro, Do Harsher Prison Conditions Reduce Recidivism?  A Discontinuity-Based Ap-
proach, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1 (2007), which uses the variability in prison conditions 
as a function of offense levels to analyze recidivism rates.  
41 See J.A. Hausman, Specification Tests in Econometrics, 46 ECONOMETRICA 1251, 
1251 (1978) (proposing a “general form of specification test”). 
42 For example, Chen and Shapiro compared the demographics of two similar 
populations and found some significant demographic differences.  See Chen & Shapi-
ro, supra note 40, at 16.  Whether the populations are nonetheless similar in relevant 
ways requires some subjective judgment.  Moreover, their analysis explicitly modeled 
the function “that relates an inmate’s score to his probability of recidivism,” id. at 17, 
including binary controls for the cutoffs, id. at 19-20.  A danger is that if there is an 
omitted variable in the analysis or a misspecification of the functional form, the coeffi-
cient estimates could be biased. 
43 Saurabh Bhargava & Vikram Pathania, Driving Under the (Cellular) Influence:  The 
Link Between Cell Phone Use and Vehicle Crashes 3 (AEI-Brookings Joint Ctr. for Regulatory 
Studies, Working Paper No. 07-15, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1089081. 
44 Id. at 4-5. 
45 Cf. Mike Stuckey, Hands-Free Phones Are Lifesavers, Study Says, MSNBC.COM, May 
13, 2008, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24580099 (discussing a study “predicting 
that banning the use of hand-held phones by U.S. drivers could save thousands of 
lives each year”). 
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regression-discontinuity studies do not necessarily have a greater im-
pact on the policy process than other studies, even with respect to the 
issues for which they are feasible. 
2.  Publication Bias and Misspecification 
Statistically significant results can also be spurious as a result of 
publication bias.  Finding a statistically significant outcome at the gen-
erally accepted 0.05 level46 means that there is a five-percent chance 
that an outcome at least as extreme would have occurred by pure 
chance if the null hypothesis were true.47  If, for example, researchers 
test 100 propositions that in fact are all false, about five of these tests 
may produce statistically significant results, and these mistaken results 
will be the most publishable.48  Meanwhile, insignificant findings pro-
vide little support for the truth of the corresponding null hypotheses.  
Insignificant findings are difficult to publish, but they may be publish-
able when they are counterintuitive.  There is a relatively high proba-
bility, however, that rare counterintuitive failures to reject the null hy-
pothesis are the result of chance.49 
Publication bias applies not only across studies but also within stu-
dies.  Researchers face many choices about how to specify regression 
equations:  what functional form to use,50 which variables to include, 
what transformations to apply to the variables,51 and which observations 
to include.52  Especially within social science, researchers do not neces-
 
46 See Fisher, supra note 3, at 504 (“A scientific fact should be regarded as experi-
mentally established only if a properly designed experiment rarely fails to give [a five-
percent] level of significance.” (emphasis omitted)). 
47 An example of a null hypothesis would be that in a regression equation’s esti-
mate of the true relationship, the coefficient for one of the independent variables is ze-
ro, which indicates that, after controlling for other variables, there is no relationship 
between the dependent variable and that independent variable. 
48 Some researchers have sought to counter publication bias by encouraging the 
publication of statistically insignificant results.  See, e.g., Huai yong Cheng, Letter to the 
Editor, The Potential Value of Negative Studies, 6 J. AM. MED. DIRECTORS ASS’N 426 (2005). 
49 See J. Bradford De Long & Kevin Lang, Are All Economic Hypotheses False?, 100 J. 
POL. ECON. 1257, 1258 (1992) (discussing “an approach that allows [its authors] to 
measure the fraction of unrejected null hypotheses that are, in fact, false”).  The De 
Long and Lang statistical analysis rejects “the null hypothesis that more than about 
one-third of unrejected null hypotheses are true.”  Id. at 1258.   
50 See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 116-144 (5th ed. 2003) 
(discussing the “functional form of the regression model”).  
51 See id. at 347 n.11 (considering the possibility of nonlinear specifications). 
52 There may be flexibility both in determining the general coverage of the study 
(for example, what years or states to study), as well as in identifying outliers.  Typically, 
when a researcher identifies an observation as an outlier, she will run a regression both 
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sarily settle on regression specifications in advance, but instead “pretest” 
data to determine which results to report.53  Considering a large num-
ber of regression specifications may help researchers develop nuanced 
conclusions, but researchers will generally be more likely to report re-
sults producing statistical significance.54  Laboratory experiments are al-
so subject to publication bias, but other researchers can attempt repli-
cation.  Social science researchers cannot rerun history.55 
Social scientists can, however, seek to assess the robustness of pub-
lished results, but often there will be some subjectivity involved in de-
termining whether a study’s results are sufficiently robust to justify 
causal inferences.  A recent example was John Donohue and Justin 
Wolfers’ scrutiny of studies purporting to show the death penalty’s de-
terrent effects.56  For example, they criticized a study by Hashem Dezh-
bakhsh and Joanna Shepherd,57 focusing first on a cross-sectional anal-
ysis of homicide trends in states that either abolished or adopted the 
death penalty, as well as states that never had a death penalty.58  Dono-
hue and Wolfers argue that the same general trends existed in states 
 
with and without the outliers to determine whether the results are robust.  There are 
also econometric techniques designed to produce estimates not overly susceptible to 
outliers.  See, e.g., PETER J. ROUSSEEUW & ANNICK M. LEROY, ROBUST REGRESSION AND 
OUTLIER DETECTION 10 (2003) (describing regression techniques that account for the 
large influence of outliers).   
53 See T. Dudley Wallace, Pretest Estimation in Regression:  A Survey, 59 AM. J. AGRIC. 
ECON. 431, 431 (1977) (“Given the nature of economic data, pretesting has been and 
probably will continue to be widely used in spite of sharp criticism.”). 
54 The traditional t-statistic will be inaccurate when researchers test numerous re-
gression specifications and then focus on only those whose t-statistics appear to indi-
cate statistically significant results.  See, e.g., Dmitry Danilov & Jan R. Magnus, Forecast 
Accuracy After Pretesting with an Application to the Stock Market, 23 J. FORECASTING 251, 258 
(2004) (deciding which model to use depending on whether the t-statistic is signifi-
cant).  For a discussion of the origin and formation of the t-statistic, see ARTHUR M. 
GLENBERG & MATTHEW E. ANDRZEJEWSKI, LEARNING FROM DATA 243 (3d ed. 2008).   
55 See Jeff Strnad, Should Legal Empiricists Go Bayesian?, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 195, 
197 (2007) (noting that, in law, “the researcher is dealing with observational data that 
cannot be extended by additional experimentation”). 
56 See John J. Donohue & Justin Wolfers, Uses and Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the 
Death Penalty Debate, 58 STAN. L. REV. 791, 840 & fig.10 (2005) (finding a “statistically 
significant correlation” between the estimated coefficients and standard errors re-
ported within most studies). 
57 See Hashem Dezhbakhsh & Joanna M. Shepherd, The Deterrent Effect of Capital 
Punishment:  Evidence from a “Judicial Experiment” 13-15 (Emory L. & Econ. Paper Series, 
Working Paper No. 04-04 & Emory Univ. Econ. Working Paper No. 03-14, 2004), avail-
able at http://ssrn.com/abstract=432621 (analyzing the “effect of both suspending and 
reinstating the death penalty on state murder rates” and concluding that “states reinst-
ating their death penalty experience a drop in murder rates”). 
58 Donohue & Wolfers, supra note 56, at 800-04. 
ABRAMOWICZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:47 PM 
2011] Randomizing Law 945 
that had not changed their death penalty policies, and Donohue and 
Wolfers reanalyzed the data with a difference-in-differences approach.59  
This revised analysis produced statistically insignificant results.60 
Such a conclusion does not mean that every empirical question 
will yield an uncertain answer.  But the death penalty is hardly the 
only debate about which scholars have hotly contested empirical out-
comes.  Other recent examples in the criminological context include 
debates about whether abortion legalization is responsible for the de-
crease in the crime rate61 and whether statutes allowing citizens to 
carry concealed handguns lower violent crime rates.62  Whatever the 
merits of the various arguments, academics and policymakers have 
not reached a consensus on these questions.  Even if the median vot-
er or decisionmaker would be swayed by empirical results, it will not 
be easy to determine what results to believe. 
Just as in nonrandom evaluations, publication bias is also a danger 
in randomized studies.63  But there is less room for identifying alterna-
tive empirical specifications given the centrality of the random variable 
in randomized trials.  As Esther Duflo has noted, in retrospective stu-
dies, “the researchers or evaluators define their own comparison 
group [ex post], and thus may be able to pick a variety of plausible 
comparison groups,”64 but in a randomized study, the treatment and 
comparison groups will generally be clearly defined at the outset of the 
study.  There is still some danger that researchers will decide not to 
 
59 See id. at 801-02 (arguing that “focusing only” on states that altered their poli-
cies risks “confounding the effects of changes in capital punishment laws with broad-
er forces”). 
60 See id. at 802 (finding that a difference-in-differences approach produces “no 
evidence that the death penalty affects homicide rates”). 
61 See John J. Donohue III & Steven D. Levitt, The Impact of Legalized Abortion on 
Crime, 116 Q.J. ECON. 379, 414 (2001) (presenting evidence suggesting that “legalized 
abortion is a primary explanation for the large drops in murder, property, crime, and 
violent crime”). 
62 See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME 159 (1998) (“Allowing citizens 
without criminal records or histories of significant mental illness to carry concealed 
handguns deters violent crimes . . . .”). 
63 Selective publication of results has been most clearly demonstrated in the medi-
cal arena, though the studies do not assess whether selective publication is a result of 
self-censorship by authors (perhaps because they do not want to suggest that a drug was 
ineffective) or by journals.  See, e.g., Erick H. Turner et al., Selective Publication of Anti-
depressant Trials and Its Influence on Apparent Efficacy, 358 NEW ENG. J. MED. 252, 253-56 
(2008) (analyzing which reviews of antidepressant agents submitted to the FDA were 
subsequently published and observing a “bias toward the publication of positive results”). 
64 Esther Duflo, Scaling Up and Evaluation, in ANNUAL WORLD BANK CONFERENCE 
ON DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 2004:  ACCELERATING DEVELOPMENT 341, 353 (François 
Bourguignon & Boris Pleskovic eds., 2004). 
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publish, but that danger is considerably reduced when governmental 
institutions have sponsored the research by supporting the randomi-
zation of policy and when a particular set of researchers has promised 
to analyze the effects of the experiment.  Indeed, governments can vir-
tually eliminate the risk of nonpublication by requiring publication of 
experimental results as a condition of funding.65 
B.  The Laboratory of the States Reconsidered 
For statistical research to influence policy rather than merely serve 
as a sound bite, it must be executed in a way that policymakers can un-
derstand and cannot ignore.  These challenges pose hurdles for a fre-
quent justification of federalism—that allowing states to make indepen-
dent choices provides a kind of laboratory to test policies.66  Susan Rose-
Ackerman, for example, has shown that federalism may insufficiently 
promote experimentation for numerous reasons,67 including because 
one state may hope to free ride on the activities of other governments.68  
Edward Rubin and Malcolm Feeley have similarly noted that experi-
mentation sometimes may be expensive and ultimately not beneficial 
 
65 For an argument in favor of clinical trial registries that require drug companies 
to release both positive and negative studies, see James M. Wood & Roxanne M. Gariby, 
Hoarding Away Science:  Towards a More Transparent View of Health and Online Registries for 
Independent Postmarket Drug Research, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 547 (2005). 
66 Justice Brandeis articulated the classic statement of this theory in his dissent in 
New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932).  He wrote, “It is one of the happy 
incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, 
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to 
the rest of the country.”  Id. at 262 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).  For a discussion of this 
justification for federalism, see Ann Althouse, Vanguard States, Laggard States:  Federalism 
and Constitutional Rights, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1745, 1750-76 (2004). 
67 See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Risk Taking and Reelection:  Does Federalism Promote  
Innovation?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 593, 615 (1980) (stating that federalism produces only 
“weak effects” in promoting innovation). 
68 See id. at 605 (“The better other governments are expected to do, the less incen-
tive any politician has to initiate projects.”).  The possibility that there might be insuffi-
cient incentives to innovate is apparent even in areas in which state competition has 
generally been trumpeted, such as corporate governance law.  See Michael Abramo-
wicz, Speeding up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139, 143 (2003) (suggesting 
that “the existence of state competition is not enough to guarantee an optimal level of 
innovation”).  But see Roberta Romano, The States as a Laboratory:  Legal Innovation and 
State Competition for Corporate Charters, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 209, 246 (2006) (arguing that 
states are, in fact, “effective laborator[ies]” in the “corporate chartering context”). 
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for the experimenter,69 suggesting that centralized coordination may be 
needed to take full advantage of federalism.70 
Yet, at least sometimes, states do change their policies—and take 
risks in doing so—in the hope of achieving informational benefits.71  
As Barry Friedman notes, states may innovate for a variety of reasons, 
quite apart from any desire to engage in “experimentation.”72  These 
state innovations serve at least a crude experimentation function.73  
Commentators may observe that one state’s approach to a particular 
issue, such as health care reform, has gone particularly poorly or well, 
and this observation may influence decisionmaking in other states.74  
Federalism, however, does not easily facilitate a scientific approach to 
experimentation.  The difficulties that social scientists and especially 
policymakers face in assessing the results of state innovations contri-
bute to the inaptness of the states-as-laboratories metaphor. 
Still, federalism may be more conducive to experimentation than 
the alternatives.  Previous commentators have noted that randomized 
experiments are much more common in North America than in the 
rest of the world,75 and they have speculated that federalism may help 
explain this.76  In any event, the mere existence of different jurisdic-
 
69 See Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism:  Some Notes on a National Neu-
rosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 925 (1994) (“[I]ndividual states will have no incentive to 
invest in experiments that involve any substance or political risk . . . .”).  
70 See id. at 926 (noting that absent “coordinat[ion] by a centralized authori-
ty . . . state-initiated experiments are unlikely to be truly useful to other states because 
of more specific, technical variations” among the states). 
71 Cf. FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 788 (1982) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[S]tate innovation is no judicial myth.”).   
72 Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 398-99 (1997) (“‘In-
novation’ might have been a better word choice for Justice Brandeis than ‘experimen-
tation,’ saving us all a lot of bother.”). 
73 Dorf and Sabel express more confidence in the ability of state innovations to 
improve knowledge, as long as there is some centralized evaluation of state activities.  
See Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 345 (explaining that administrative agencies can serve 
as “the continuing organized link between the national and the local, helping to create 
through national action the local conditions for experimentation, and changing na-
tional arrangements accordingly”). 
74 See, e.g., Sara Rosenbaum, Mothers and Children Last:  The Oregon Medicaid Experi-
ment, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 97, 126 (1992) (concluding that Oregon’s series of Medicaid 
initiatives is an experiment that “this nation cannot afford to conduct” because it “fails 
the basic test of civility”). 
75 See GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 38 (noting as an exception that the Neth-
erlands tested an unemployment-counseling program). 
76 Id.  One justification for this is that “[f]ederal funds for particular programs 
may be used with considerable discretion by the states, and this fact has encouraged 
the view that the states should literally be the laboratories of democracy.”  Id.  
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tions could be conducive to randomized experimentation in two ways.  
First, it may be possible to randomize policies across states, at least 
among states that consent.  It would be more awkward to randomize 
policies in the absence of generally accepted jurisdictional boundaries.  
Second, states themselves can serve as loci for experimentation at 
smaller jurisdictional levels, such as cities and counties.  Indeed, ran-
domized experiments have increasingly been conducted within states.77 
III.  CAVEATS:  LIMITS OF RANDOMIZATION STUDIES 
A.  Interpretive Problems 
Advocates of randomized studies have emphasized that only these 
types of studies can establish causality with high confidence.  For ex-
ample, Esther Duflo has argued: 
[W]hile it is always possible to reject experimental results on the 
grounds that the experiment was poorly designed, or failed, when an 
experiment is correctly implemented (which is relatively easy to ascer-
tain), there is no doubt that it gives us the effect of the manipulation 
that was implemented . . . .
78
  
But what “is relatively easy to ascertain” may remain controversial in 
public debate.  Moreover, even if the measured effects can be confi-
dently traced to the “manipulation,” some extrapolation will general-
ly be needed to assess the full consequences of a law enacting the le-
gal experiment.  This Section suggests that this requirement may be 
explained because legal experiments will not generally be double-
blind, because it may be difficult to generalize from the experimental 
context to the ultimate policy context, and because randomization 
may be imperfect. 
1.  Non-Double-Blind Randomization 
The purest form of a randomized experiment includes informa-
tional control over both the researcher and the subjects.  In double-
blind experiments, for example, neither the researchers nor the sub-
jects know the identity of the treated and untreated subjects during 
the course of the experiment.  Under a double-blind design, the  
 
77 Cf. id. at 38 (“[T]he role of the federal government in funding social experi-
ments, although still dominant, has diminished somewhat over time, whereas that of 
state governments has grown.”). 
78 Esther Duflo, Field Experiments in Development Economics 23 ( Jan. 2006) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/800. 
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researcher remains blind to each subject’s group until the researcher 
has coded all the outcome variables.  Researchers who remain in the 
dark when coding outcomes cannot shade their coding to favor a par-
ticular outcome.  Hence, double-blind designs can protect against  
observer bias.79  Keeping subjects in the dark as to whether or not they 
are in the treatment group analogously ensures that their behavior 
and emotional outlook are not biased by the knowledge of how they 
are being treated.  In medicine, the standard way to implement  
patient ignorance is with placebo-controlled studies.  In a placebo-
controlled drug study, for example, all patients would receive pills, 
but the control group would receive a placebo pill, often a sugar pill.80 
In randomized tests on laws and public information, it will be 
harder to keep subjects in the dark about how they are being treated 
or the fact that they are subjects in an experiment.  For example, sup-
pose that one were randomly to select certain workplaces to subject to 
a more rigorous set of workplace-safety standards to help assess the 
costs and benefits of higher standards.  Businesses would need to know 
which set of workplace safety standards applied to them.  The transpa-
rency of this randomization, however, is not as significant a concern 
here as it is in a medical context.  Medical researchers are primarily in-
terested in the impact of a drug independent of any placebo effects.  
In the policy arena, on the other hand, researchers want to see how 
knowledge of the law affects people’s behavior.  Information about 
whether a workplace is treated becomes part of the treatment, but this 
knowledge is not inherently bad because the researcher’s ultimate 
question is whether a known legal change will have an impact. 
There is, however, another problem.  Even when subjects do not 
know whether they are in the treatment or control group, they will 
typically know that they are participating in a randomized experi-
ment.  This knowledge of participation, by itself, may affect results.  
The impact of knowing that they are being observed might, for ex-
ample, make subjects alter their behavior to please (or to displease) 
the researcher.  For example, Henry Landsberger recognized this ef-
 
79 See RONALD A. MCQUEEN & CHRISTINA KNUSSEN, INTRODUCTION TO RESEARCH 
METHODS AND STATISTICS IN PSYCHOLOGY 42-44 (2006) (discussing how to control for 
a “researcher effect”).  
80 In 1862 Austin Flint conducted the first placebo-controlled experiment when he 
treated a small number of hospital inmates for rheumatic fever.  See AUSTIN FLINT, A 
TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES OF MEDICINE 1019-20 (4th ed. 1873) (dis-
cussing his treatment of cases of articular rheumatism with “palliative measures only”).  
The control group received what Flint called a “placebo,” or “placeboic remedy,” of a 
“very largely diluted” “tincture of quassia.”  Id. at 1020. 
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fect when analyzing the Hawthorne Experiments, which were con-
ducted near Chicago between 1924 and 1927 to determine the effects 
that better lighting conditions had on workers’ performances.81  In 
that case, the researchers found a short-term improvement in worker 
performance after almost any change in lighting,82 but productivity 
soon returned to normal levels.83  Although there remains some con-
troversy over whether the experimental context did affect productivity 
in that experiment,84 the label “Hawthorne effect” is now commonly 
applied to describe changes in behavior attributable to the knowledge 
by individuals that they are experimental subjects—rather than to the 
substance of the experimental manipulation.85  Similarly, the phrase 
“John Henry effect” is used to describe changes in behavior in compari-
son groups whose members recognize that they are not being subjected 
to experimental manipulations.86 
In medical randomized trials, Hawthorne effects are a concern 
because the ethical requirement of informed consent necessitates that 
subjects be informed about and consent to participation in the ran-
domized trial.87  In the legal context, however, sometimes knowledge 
 
81 See generally HENRY A. LANDSBERGER, HAWTHORNE REVISITED 1-27 (1958) (de-
scribing the experiments).  
82 See Richard Pearson Gillespie, Manufacturing Knowledge:  A History of the 
Hawthorne Experiments 165 (1985) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Pennsylvania) (on file with Van Pelt Library, University of Pennsylvania) (“[W]hile 
production in all three test groups showed an improvement, it could not be correlated 
with those periods in which lighting was higher.”).  
83 Id. at 170. 
84 Compare WILLIAM H. W H Y T E, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN 34 (1956) (noting 
that “output did shoot ahead where conditions were changed, but so did output shoot 
ahead where no changes had been made”), with Stephen R.G. Jones, Was There a Haw-
thorne Effect?, 98 AM. J. SOC. 451, 467 (1992) (finding “essentially no evidence of Haw-
thorne effects, either unconditionally or with allowance for direct effects of the exper-
imental variables themselves”). 
85 See Jones, supra note 84, at 452-53 (providing numerous examples of authors 
discussing Hawthorne effects). 
86 See Esther Duflo et al., Using Randomization in Development Economics Research:  A 
Toolkit (“The comparison group may feel offended to be a comparison group and react 
by also altering their behavior (for example, teachers in the comparison group for an 
evaluation may ‘compete’ with the treatment teachers or, on the contrary, decide to 
slack off) .”), in 4 HANDBOOK OF DEVELOPMENTAL ECONOMICS, 3895, 3951 (T. Paul 
Schultz & John Strauss eds., 2008); see also Allen C. Barrett & Doris A. White, How John 
Henry Effects Confound the Measurement of Self Esteem in Primary Prevention Programs for 
Drug Abuse in Middle Schools, J. ALCOHOL & DRUG EDUC., Spring 1991, at 87, 99 (provid-
ing an alleged example of a John Henry effect). 
87 But cf. David A. Braunholtz et al., Are Randomized Clinical Trials Good for Us (in the 
Short Term)?  Evidence for a “Trial Effect,” 54 J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 217, 219 (2001) 
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of a change does not necessitate that subjects know that they are tak-
ing part in a randomized study.  For example, one could imagine a 
test of speed limits in which the posted limits on different roads were 
randomly increased or decreased.  The drivers on these roads could 
be informed of the treatment (i.e., the speed limit on that road) with-
out necessarily knowing that they were participating in a randomized 
experiment.  But there may be other cases in which almost all subjects 
will know that there is a legal experiment.  In an experiment on 
workplace safety, the businesses subject to the new rules would likely 
find out the reason for the new rules, and it also seems likely that oth-
ers in the industry would recognize the experimental context.  This 
awareness could lead business owners to be temporarily more cogni-
zant of workplace safety issues, possibly muting the effects of the high-
er standards.  In addition, businesses may act in a particular way or 
report misleading data because they hope to influence the ultimate 
policy result.  This result is less likely to be a concern, however, if 
there are a large number of businesses in the experiment, so that each 
business is likely to have only a small effect. 
2.  Generalizability 
The prior subsection noted the difficulty of extrapolating from a 
sample with certain informational attributes—such as subjects know-
ing that they were participating in an experiment—to a population 
with different informational attributes.  There are analogous prob-
lems of extrapolation when the tested sample may be unrepresentative 
of the larger population.  James Heckman, with a number of different 
coauthors, has written extensively about these dangers of “randomiza-
tion bias” in policy experiments—dangers that “cause[] the type of 
persons participating in a program [treatment group] to differ from 
the type that would participate in the program as it normally oper-
ates.”88  These dangers may occur as a result of self-selection because 
 
(noting that once patients are “exposed to the informed consent process,” the Haw-
thorne effect becomes less relevant).  
88 James J. Heckman & Jeffrey A. Smith, Assessing the Case for Social Experiments, J. 
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1995, at 85, 99; see also James J. Heckman & Richard Robb, Jr., 
Alternative Methods for Evaluating the Impact of Interventions (considering the “problem of 
estimating the impact of interventions in the presence of selection decisions by 
agents”), in LONGITUDINAL ANALYSIS OF LABOR MARKET DATA 156, 158 ( James J. 
Heckman & Burton Singer eds., 1985); James J. Heckman & Jeffrey Smith, Assessing the 
Case for Randomized Evaluation of Social Programs (describing the “selection problem” as 
the fact that “persons who participate in a program are different from persons who do 
not participate in the sense that the mean outcomes of participants in the non-
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volunteers for an experiment differ from those to whom a policy 
might apply, or because of what we call “experimenter selection,” 
where the experimental design differs from how a permanent policy 
would operate in terms of the group affected or in some other way. 
a.  Self-Selection 
One problem is that it may be inappropriate to extrapolate from 
subjects who have volunteered, or at least consented, to be tested to a 
population containing people who would not volunteer or consent.  
If the attributes of people that lead them not to consent also lead 
them to react differently to the treatment, then the treatment may 
produce different effects on the general population.  Volunteers are 
a self-selecting group of individuals who seek exposure to an exper-
imental policy.  The causal impact of the experimental policy on this 
self-selecting group may be different from the causal impact of the 
policy on the average individual it affects.89  Chemotherapy drugs, for 
example, increase the life expectancy of some cancer patients but de-
crease the life expectancy of those free of cancer (because of the 
drugs’ side effects).90  Volunteers for experiments involving chemo-
therapy drugs may not provide good estimates for the effect of the 
experimental chemotherapy on cancer patients.  Volunteers may 
generally be sicker than the average cancer patient and therefore 
ready to try unproven therapies. 
The same is true with regard to policies.  The volunteers for a pol-
icy experiment provide an accurate estimate of the causal effects of 
the policy only if the volunteers are representative of the group of in-
 
participation state would be different from those of non-participants”), in MEASURING 
LABOUR MARKET MEASURES 35, 45-46 (Karsten Jensen & Per Kongshoj Madsen eds., 
1993); James J. Heckman & V. Joseph Hotz, Choosing Among Alternative Nonexperimental 
Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs:  The Case of Manpower Training, 84 J. 
AM. STAT. ASSOC. 862, 874 (1989) (“[S]imple specification tests eliminate the most un-
reliable and misleading estimators that give rise to the sensitivity problem . . . .”).  See 
generally James J. Heckman, Randomization and Social Program Evaluation (discussing the 
“benefits and limitations of randomized social experiments” (emphasis omitted)), in 
EVALUATING WELFARE AND TRAINING PROGRAMS 201 (Charles F. Manski & Irwin Gar-
finkel eds., 1992).  
89 When causal impacts of a treatment vary across individuals, the treatment effect 
is called “heterogeneous.”  For a discussion of heterogeneous treatment effects, see 
James J. Heckman, Micro Data, Heterogeneity, and the Evaluation of Public Policy:  Nobel Lec-
ture, 109 J. POL. ECON. 673, 690-704 (2001).   
90 See, e.g., Laurence A. Cole et al., Letter to the Editor, False-Positive hCG Assay Results 
Leading to Unnecessary Surgery and Chemotherapy and Needless Occurrences of Diabetes and Coma, 
45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 313, 314 (1999) (noting that false positives can produce negative 
results, such as unnecessary chemotherapy, which put one patient into a coma).  
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dividuals who will be affected by the fully enacted policy.  Consider an 
experimental job-skills program.  People who volunteer for such a 
program may be especially likely to benefit from participation.  Exper-
imenters can attempt to control for differential effects, but some of 
the variables that affect the volunteers’ responses to the job-skills pro-
gram will be unobservable.  Volunteers may be particularly disciplined 
in following the program (raising the impact of the program), and the 
discipline of volunteers may be unobservable or uncorrelated with 
other observables. 
In this case, the estimated effect of the program for volunteers will 
be higher than the effect for the average low-skill person, and experi-
menters cannot adjust their effect estimates to account for discipline.  
If policymakers consider making the program mandatory for people 
of a certain skill level, then the experimental estimate of the pro-
gram’s effect using volunteers will be biased.  Volunteer experiments 
can, however, guide policymakers in determining whether to offer—
but not mandate—a policy to the general population.  Under volun-
tary programs, the government’s offer is in some sense the treatment. 
Treatment will sometimes affect volunteers and compelled indi-
viduals similarly.  In medicine, it is routine to move from randomized 
tests on volunteers to quasi-mandatory, across-the-board treatment 
proposals for individuals whose condition is similar to those who were 
subject to experiments.  The problem, however, may generally be 
more severe for legal experiments, because it may be more difficult in 
a legal context to control for other characteristics.  Perhaps research-
ers can make some headway in measuring the severity of cancer ac-
cording to test results and symptoms.91  But individual psychology and 
business strategies are so diverse that it will often be difficult to come 
up with metrics that serve as effective controls. 
The government can respond to this “voluntariness” problem by 
designing tests with mandatory participation.  Ethical rules require 
that patients consent to participation in medical experiments, but the 
government can, and has, applied different rules and regulations to 
different individuals and businesses.  For example, the Emergency 
Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991 authorized the U.S. De-
partment of Labor to test the impact of a job-search assistance pro-
 
91 See, e.g., Nicholas Wade, Speed Reading of DNA May Help Cancer Treatment, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2010, at D4 (“Researchers at Johns Hopkins University have developed a 
way to monitor the progress of a patient’s cancer treatment using a new technique for 
rapidly sequencing, or decoding, large amounts of DNA.”).  
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gram by randomly requiring certain recipients of unemployment in-
surance to participate in the program.92 
b.  Experimenter Selection 
Even when an experimenter can compel participation, there is 
still a danger that the experimental context may differ from the con-
text in which a policy ultimately would be implemented.  The experi-
ment might affect a different population, be on a smaller scale, in-
volve a different legal change, test only marginal policy changes, occur 
for only a limited period of time, or involve greater or lesser commit-
ments of resources. 
The population may differ if a researcher conducts an experiment 
in only one location or only with some nonrandom subset of the indi-
viduals and entities who would eventually be affected by a law.  Cost 
considerations may justify such nonrepresentativeness, and indeed it is 
common for “demonstration projects” to be deployed in one or more 
particular regions rather than randomly.93  At times, skepticism about 
inferences from an experiment on a nonrepresentative population 
may be justified.94  For example, a randomized workplace-safety expe-
riment on a sample of small firms might not extrapolate easily to a 
sample of large firms.  It may be feasible sometimes to conduct ran-
domization at a national level, for example in choosing Medicare reci-
 
92 See Emergency Unemployment Compensation Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
164, § 201(c)(3)(A), 105 Stat. 1049, 1056 (providing for the “random selection of eli-
gible individuals for participation in the program and for inclusion in a control 
group”).  This program was in effect from November 17, 1991, to February 5, 1994.  
See I.R.C. § 3304 note; see also PAUL T. DECKER ET AL., MATHEMATICAL POLICY RE-
SEARCH, INC., ASSISTING UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE CLAIMANTS:  THE LONG-TERM 
IMPACTS OF THE JOB SEARCH ASSISTANCE DEMONSTRATION 7 (2000), available at 
http://www.workforcesecurity.doleta.gov/dmstree/op/op2k/op_02-00.pdf (discussing 
the program); Marcus Stanley et al., Developing Skills:  What We Know About the Im-
pacts of American Employment and Training Programs on Employment, Earnings, 
and Educational Outcomes 40-42 (Oct. 1998) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/katz/files/stanley_katz_krueger_98.pdf 
(explaining that various programs in Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, South Carolina, 
and Washington were “conducted as random assignment experiments, making their 
results particularly reliable”). 
93 For a discussion of the transition from local demonstration projects to projects 
on a national scale, see Duflo, supra note 64, at 342-55. 
94 See, e.g., GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 15 (“[I]mpact estimates frequently 
are limited to relatively few geographic areas.  Because the sites are rarely selected ran-
domly, the external validity of the evaluations can be questioned.” (footnote omitted)). 
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pients who will receive extra follow-up phone calls.95  If policy is to be 
implemented at a national level, then this sort of experimentation will 
provide a sound assessment of policy.  Often, however, coordination 
and data-gathering needs may make this process difficult. 
Moreover, even if policy is to be implemented at a national level, 
such a characteristic does not necessarily mean that a single uniform 
policy will be optimal.  Randomized results give powerful and transpa-
rent information about the average impact of the law on policy out-
comes, but teasing out causal information on subgroups of the popu-
lation is much more difficult.96  For example, imagine that a speed-
limit study randomizing across different cities shows that twenty mile-
per-hour limits produce more accidents than thirty mile-per-hour lim-
its.  It might still be that small, rural cities fare better with the lower 
limit.  One can run regressions on the results of randomized studies to 
test whether the average result holds true for subgroups within the 
tested sample.  As long as the treatment is randomly applied across 
small cities, for example, the small-cities subsample can be viewed as a 
subexperiment.  But because a population can be divided in any 
number of ways and statistically significant results are likely to exist by 
chance for some subsamples, researchers will occasionally need to 
draw admittedly arbitrary lines and must use theoretical considera-
tions to help assess whether statistically significant results for subpopu-
lations seem plausible. 
Scale may be an even more important concern.  A common criti-
cism of laboratory experiments is that people may not behave as they 
would in other decisionmaking contexts because the stakes are too tri-
vial.97  Similar problems can affect randomized experiments.  Suppose, 
for example, that the federal government tested the effects of mini-
 
95 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (discussing a Medicare statute requir-
ing randomized testing of programs). 
96 See James J. Heckman, Detecting Discrimination, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Spring 
1998, at 101, 101-03 (discussing the difficulty in “[e]stimating the extent and degree of 
discrimination” in the labor market).  
97 See Duflo, supra note 78, at 21 (“Economists are often suspicious of lab experi-
ments, because it is not clear that behavior observed in the lab would still apply when 
people make ‘real’ decisions . . . .”).  This challenge to effective experiments helps to 
explain why researchers studying social norms through ultimatum games have experi-
mented in relatively poor countries, where it is feasible to make the stakes large 
enough to affect experimental subjects’ welfare.  Cf. Robert Slonim & Alvin E. Roth, 
Learning in High Stakes Ultimatum Games:  An Experiment in the Slovak Republic, 66 ECONO-
METRICA 569, 570-71 (1998) (reporting on an experiment in the Slovak Republic that 
had varying stakes to “increase the power of the experiment to detect differences in 
behavior due to differences in stakes”).  
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mum-wage laws by randomly selecting one percent of adults and allow-
ing those selected the option of informing employers that they would 
not need to be paid minimum wage.  In theory, eliminating the mini-
mum wage might increase employment.  But businesses may not think 
it worthwhile to change their hiring practices or risk dissension due to 
inconsistent wages in order to have the chance to hire a few more 
workers at a lower wage.  Data from such a study, therefore, might not 
reliably reflect the effect of eliminating the minimum wage.98 
In addition, the legal changes effected by an experiment will gen-
erally be temporary, and responses to temporary laws may be different 
from responses to permanent laws.  Sometimes an experiment meas-
ures only marginal effects, either because the experiment is temporary 
or because the experiment explicitly limits itself to an intervention at 
the margin.99  There is no guarantee that marginal effects will correctly 
identify the approximate impact of the policy.  For example, in the 
hypothetical concealed-carry experiment,100 a permanent law might 
encourage more people to possess concealed handguns than a tempo-
rary law, but it is unclear how the additional group of adopters differs 
from the group that responds even to the temporary law.  Perhaps the 
initial responders will tend to include more criminals seeking to take 
advantage of the law and the subsequent group will include more law-
abiding individuals, but this conclusion is only speculation. 
At other times, a temporary law may be a poor proxy for long-term 
effects because the law will have both dynamic and static effects.  For 
example, studies that seek to assess school-choice plans may fail to 
capture what proponents of such plans claim is a principal benefit—
that free enterprise allows educational entrepreneurs to learn what 
works over time.101  Other possible arguments suggest that a static 
analysis might overestimate the benefits of free choice.  In the short 
term, private schools might be willing to lose money in the hopes of 
 
98 This hypothetical study, however, is not without value.  The fact that the 
change is “not worth the trouble” suggests that the benefits of the experimental poli-
cy are simply limited to some degree. 
99 See, e.g., Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access:  Using 
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts 4 ( June 25, 2007) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at www.hks.harvard.edu/inequality/Seminar/Papers/ 
Karlan_071.pdf (reporting on an experiment in which loan officers were “randomly 
encouraged . . . to approve some marginal applications”). 
100 See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
101 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe, Beyond the Free Market:  The Structure of School Choice, 2008 
BYU L. REV. 557, 571 (noting that current voucher programs are “too small and too 
new” to determine “whether the voucher amounts are large enough to . . . stimulate a 
sufficient supply-side response by schools over time”). 
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increasing the chance of being permitted to continue to receive pub-
lic funds in the future.  As another example, critics of the time-of-use 
electricity experiments argue that with a longer-term study, customers 
would buy appliances that would help them adjust their electricity use 
based on time of day.102 
3.  Imperfect Randomization 
The above subsections have addressed the danger that the tested 
population might differ systematically from the more general popula-
tion applicable to the legal experiment.  There is also another problem 
with randomization—ensuring that the treatment group receives the 
treatment and the control group does not.  A computer can randomize 
between treatment and control groups, but it is not always easy to en-
sure that the computer’s decisions are followed or that the results are 
properly measured.  Dangers include attrition (randomized individuals 
or entities dropping out of a study), crossover (control group members 
receiving the treatment, or vice versa), and spillovers (treatment hav-
ing some effect on the control group as well). 
a.  Attrition 
Attrition is a problem not merely because it decreases the size of 
the sample, but also because it may bias experimental results when the 
attrition rate depends on selection for treatment.  Consider, for ex-
ample, studies assessing school improvements in a developing coun-
try.  A school’s random placement into a control group might in-
crease student drop-out rates.103  If the dropouts tend to be the weaker 
students, and if the measurement of school success depends on the 
test results of current students, then attrition produces an artificial 
hurdle for the treatment.  Attrition can also bias results when rando-
mization occurs at the individual level.  In a medical study, for exam-
ple, people who receive the treatment but then suffer severe side ef-
 
102 See, e.g., Aigner, supra note 11, at 46 (noting that “these experiments only al-
low us to estimate short-run elasticities of demand, given existing appliance stocks”) .  
103 See, e.g., Abhijit V. Banerjee et al., Remedying Education:  Evidence from Two Rando-
mized Experiments in India, 122 Q.J. ECON. 1235, 1245 (2007) (noting that in an educa-
tional experiment using randomization, “[d]ifferential attrition between the treatment 
and comparison groups could potentially bias the results”). 
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fects might refuse to participate further in the study, making those 
who continue with the treatment a nonrepresentative sample.104 
Given any degree of attrition, those reviewing a study may argue 
about the best interpretation of the results.  Statisticians may attempt 
to impute measurements for those who drop out by comparing their 
characteristics with those of other subjects.105  But this solution is im-
perfect because there may be some unmeasurable difference between 
those who continue in an experiment and those who drop out.  Ulti-
mately, sound statistical judgment is needed to assess the reliability of 
such models. 
A more objective solution is to use matched samples.106  If some-
one from the treatment group drops out, a result from the corres-
ponding match in the control group should not be counted either.107  
This approach also can be used when randomization is at the institu-
tional or jurisdictional level, if individuals can be matched across insti-
tutions or jurisdictions.108  With matching, it is not necessary to con-
struct a model ex post that seeks to correct for attrition bias—a 
method that would increase the danger of subjectivity, which in turn 
increases the risk that the researcher will be able to choose a specifica-
tion that meets the researcher’s goals.  Statisticians would need to as-
sign the original matches based on observable characteristics, but the 
 
104 The converse may also be true.  As Banerjee and his coauthors hypothesize, 
“[I]f weak children were less likely to drop out when they benefitted from a [tutor], 
this could bias the program effect downwards.” Id. 
105 See, e.g., Richard B. Miller & David W. Wright, Detecting and Correcting Attrition 
Bias in Longitudinal Family Research, 57 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 921, 922 (1995) (describing 
the standard method of responding to this problem by incorporating a variable 
representing the probability of dropping out directly into the study (citing James J. 
Heckman, Sample Selection Bias, 47 ECONOMETRICA 153 (1979) and James J. Heckman, 
The Common Structure of Statistical Methods of Truncation, Sample Selection and Limited De-
pendent Variables and a Simple Estimator for Such Models, 5 ANNALS ECON. & SOC. MEASU-
REMENT 475 (1976)).  
106 See Duflo et al., supra note 86, at 3925 (“An extreme version of blocked design 
is the pairwise matched design where pairs of units are constituted, and in each pair, 
one unit is randomly assigned to the treatment and one unit is randomly assigned to 
the control.”). 
107 So, for example, if an experiment were to test whether eating at a government-
run restaurant that served only healthy food improved health outcomes, subjects 
would be randomized into the group that received free meals at the restaurant and a 
control group.  For each person in the treatment group who decided to stop coming 
to the restaurant, the matched person in the control group would also not be counted. 
108 Continuing the example from the previous footnote, supra note 107, if some 
jurisdictions were randomly selected and offered free federally provided healthy food 
restaurants but then declined them, results from the matching control jurisdictions 
also would not be counted. 
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matches would be difficult to manipulate because the researchers will 
not know in advance who will drop out. 
b.  Crossover 
Legal experimentation may be less vulnerable to crossover than 
other social experimentation.  When a particular legal regime is as-
signed to some individual or entity, it is not easy to escape.  Nonethe-
less, imperfections may occur, especially if the government wishes to 
leave some room for later discretion.  For example, crossover can oc-
cur if well-connected people can thwart random assignment.  Alan 
Krueger, studying the effect of student-to-teacher ratios, found that 
some parents had managed to convince schools to reassign their 
children from larger to smaller classes.109  This sort of influence dilutes 
the treatment, as the smaller classes become larger, and it also means 
that the treated students on average will come from families with rela-
tively high motivation.110 
Once again, statistical correctives exist.  Under an “intent-to-treat” 
methodology, an individual or entity who crosses over is counted with 
the group to which that person or entity was originally assigned.111  
This practice reduces the measured effect of the treatment.  Statisti-
cians, however, can compensate for the bias that the intent-to-treat 
approach introduces with a simple mathematical formula.112  Assuming 
that it is possible to measure who ended up receiving the treatment 
and who received the control, the formula can be applied mechanical-
ly, without allowing the experimenters any discretion.  This correction 
will generally improve the estimate of the treatment effect.113  This ad-
 
109 See Alan B. Krueger, Experimental Estimates of Education Production Functions, 114 
Q.J. ECON. 497, 505 (1999) (reporting lower attrition rates of students in smaller 
classes, with some exceptions).  
110 See id. at 506 (“[I]f the movement between class types was associated with stu-
dent characteristics (e.g., students with stronger academic backgrounds more likely to 
move into small classes), these transitions would bias a simple comparison of outcomes 
across class types.”). 
111 See, e.g., Guido W. Imbens & Joshua D. Angrist, Identification and Estimation of 
Local Average Treatment Effects, 62 ECONOMETRICA 467, 472 (1994) (discussing the in-
tent-to-treat approach). 
112 As Esther Duflo explains, a statistician can “scale up the difference [between 
the treatment and the control group] by dividing it by the difference in the probability 
of receiving the treatment in those two groups.”  Duflo, supra note 64, at 354 (citing 
Imbens & Angrist, supra note 111).  
113 See Imbens & Angrist, supra note 111, at 470 (describing a theorem that “im-
plies that local average treatment effects can be estimated by comparing the average of 
outcome Y and treatment D at two different values of the instrument Z ”).  
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justment is imperfect, though, because those who cross over may differ 
systematically from those who do not.114  Once again, this flaw illu-
strates that even with randomized statistical methodologies, such statis-
tical judgment may be needed to interpret the study results. 
c.  Spillovers 
The final danger of randomization is that the treatment will spill 
over onto the control group.  Suppose, for example, that a shame sanc-
tion reduces recidivism not only among those who are shamed, but al-
so among those who are randomized to the control group and happen 
to hear about the shaming.  Or suppose that firms randomized to a re-
laxed securities-disclosure regime decide that they want to disclose as 
much as their competitors do.  The comparison of treatment and con-
trol groups will underestimate the effects of the intervention because 
the control group has adopted the treatment as well.  On the other 
hand, suppose that a random experiment eliminates speed limits on a 
random set of roads.  Some drivers on the control roads may conclude 
that police, needing to fill their time somehow, will devote extra atten-
tion to the control roads.  If these drivers slow down, measurements of 
the speed differential will be exaggerated. 
Sometimes, a feasible solution is to randomize across geographical 
areas, rather than across individuals.  Edward Miguel and Michael 
Kremer showed, for example, that randomized studies at an individual 
level underestimated the benefits of deworming drugs, which bene-
fited those in the immediate area who had not received the drugs.115  
Randomizing across geographical areas largely solved the problem.116  
This solution is not without drawbacks, however.  Especially if the 
number of jurisdictions is small, a comparison of changes in treatment 
and control jurisdictions may not have much statistical power.  In addi-
tion, some people may move to take advantage of the law elsewhere.117 
 
114 See id. at 472 (providing examples of when the application of the formula 
would be and would not be appropriate).  
115 Edward Miguel & Michael Kremer, Worms:  Identifying Impacts on Education and 
Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities, 72 ECONOMETRICA 159, 208 (2004). 
116 Id. 
117 Randomization across geographic areas can produce Tiebout sorting in much 
the same way as endogenous policy selection does.  See generally Charles M. Tiebout, A 
Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (providing the seminal 
account of the effects of citizen mobility). 
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B.  Other Issues 
1.  Costs 
Experimental costs include implementation costs and direct expe-
rimental-policy costs.  Other things equal, the lower these costs for a 
given policy, the stronger the argument for experimentation.  Imple-
menting a policy experiment can be expensive.  Policymakers must 
first overcome obstacles to experimentation, such as citizen opposi-
tion.  When opposition to randomization is high, convincing the ex-
perimental subjects that the experiment is in their interest may neces-
sitate more effort than the value of the information that the 
experiment would yield.  Once an experiment is approved, the im-
plementation costs continue.  Policymakers must inform individuals 
subject to the experimental policy about the change in policy while 
making clear to the rest of the population (the control group) that 
their policy landscape remains unchanged.  Adding to the complexity, 
a policy experiment’s “laboratory” is the everyday world of human be-
havior, rather than the controlled setting of the scientific lab. 
This landscape creates several complications.  First, policymakers 
must determine means to measure the outcomes of interest.  At times, 
preexisting data-collection efforts may reflect the outcomes of interest, 
but, at other times, new sources of data on outcomes must be found.  
Such data-gathering efforts will be costly.  Second, policymakers must 
confront the noncompliance problem.  Individuals are not mice and 
may find ways to avoid complying with the experimental treatment.  
Policymakers must find legitimate means of limiting such noncom-
pliance, but such means will generally be costly.  Even so, there will al-
ways be some number of noncompliers, and policymakers must ascer-
tain means of preventing attrition and noncompliance from biasing 
the results of the experiment. 
It is possible to use randomized experimentation to test many dif-
ferent variations on policies.  For example, a test of speed limits 
could allow for a wide range of speed limits, or it could test whether a 
tailored policy (of thirty miles-per-hour in small cities and twenty 
miles-per-hour in large cities) is superior to an untailored policy (of 
thirty miles-per-hour in all cities).118  But the possibilities for tailoring 
 
118 Randomized testing of this kind on the Internet has shown, for example, that 
tailoring a retail website’s landing pages to depend on specific search queries produces 
more sales than does a one-size-fits-all homepage.  For example, clicking on a Google 
advertisement for http://www.musiciansfriend.com after searching for “electric guitar” 
will take you to a different page than will clicking on the same advertisement after 
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in any particular arena are endless, and it is unreasonable to expect 
that more than a tiny fraction of these possibilities will ever be tested.  
Hence, it will be important for lawmakers and regulators to use theory 
and intuition to guide their choice of scarce options in order to de-
termine with full awareness whether untested policies may still be pre-
ferable to tested polices.  Sometimes, it may be worthwhile to focus on 
what seems to be the most attractive possibility, even if there is some 
chance that a more attractive option will emerge later. 
Happily, the costs of experimental design and implementation are 
subject to economies of scale.  If legislators and administrators begin 
to implement many experiments, then they will learn effective tech-
niques for experimentation.  In addition, public familiarity with expe-
rimental processes may reduce the costs of convincing the public to 
participate in experiments and may reduce the costs of explaining the 
experimental policy to the subjects of the policy.  Therefore, the mar-
ginal costs of experimental policies should decline with the number of 
policies.  A widespread and systematic emphasis on policy experimen-
tation would decrease costs with respect to the current practice of pie-
cemeal government-policy experimentation. 
Economies of scale, however, reduce the marginal costs of expe-
rimentation but cannot eliminate them.  As a result, policymakers 
should first experiment with policies that have low experimentation 
costs, all else being equal.  While it is impossible to describe complete-
ly the factors influencing the costs of experimentation, several salient 
policy features are worth examining.  Most obviously, policymakers 
should experiment with policies that have relatively positive expected 
effects.119  In other words, policymakers should experiment with the 
best candidates first.  This strategy will reduce the direct costs of expe-
rimentation on the subjects of the experimental policy.  Meanwhile, 
 
searching for “electric bass” because randomized testing of contingent strategy by 
Omniture showed a higher revenue of fifteen percent per customer when the landing 
pages were tailored to the specific search queries.  Conversation between Ian Ayres 
and Matt Roche, President, Omniture ( June 14, 2007); see also AYRES, supra note 14, 
at 55-56 (describing Google AdWords); Paat Rusmevichientong & David Williamson, 
An Adaptive Algorithm for Selecting Profitable Keywords for Search-Based Advertising Services 
(same), in PROCEEDINGS OF THE 7TH ACM CONFERENCE ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 
260, 260 ( Joan Feigenbaum et al. eds., 2006).  For more information on Google Ad-
Words, see generally Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AdWords (last visited 
Jan. 15, 2011), and text accompanying infra note 192.   
119 See Yair Listokin, Learning Through Policy Variation, 118 YALE L.J. 480, 513-14 
(2008) (arguing that, in many cases, the expected effect of policy is less important than 
the variance of the expected effects, but other things being equal, higher-expected 
value policies are superior to lower-expected value policies).   
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experiments should generally be as modest as possible, but still big 
enough to have measurable effects. 
An additional consideration is that concentrated populations of 
experimental subjects are likely to have lower experimental imple-
mentation costs than will diffuse subject populations.  Informing the 
entire national population of the existence of a randomized experi-
ment and of each individual’s status as subject or control within the 
experiment is likely to be prohibitively expensive.  By contrast, inform-
ing each company on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) of the ex-
istence of an experiment, as well as the company’s experimental sta-
tus, will be much easier.  The population of NYSE companies is clearly 
defined and finite, reducing the costs of the experiment.  As a result, 
policymakers should first pursue experimental policies when the tar-
get population of the policy is small, ceteris paribus. 
2.  Ethical Concerns 
This Article’s treatment of the ethics of randomized legal experi-
ments will be brief for two reasons.  First, the Article’s general argu-
ment does not depend on resolving whether the government must ob-
tain informed consent in such experiments.  Even with an informed-
consent requirement, randomized experimentation could still occur 
for many policies.  For example, there will generally be no ethical ob-
jections to an experiment like the Medicare experiment,120 where any 
participant may choose not to receive the services that the govern-
ment offers.121  Second, an existing collection of essays already ex-
plores this issue in considerable detail.122 
This subsection will address ethical concerns, summarizing and 
developing the argument that legal experimentation imposes no eth-
ical hurdles beyond those inherent in general legal policymaking, 
while also sketching the opposing position.  The argument against an 
informed-consent requirement distinguishes legal experimentation 
 
120 See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text (describing the program requiring 
nurses to call Medicare patients in an attempt to reduce costs). 
121 There may, however, be objections based on inequality among those who vo-
lunteer for the experiment, an issue to which the Article will return below.  See infra 
subsection III.B.3 (discussing equality concerns for individuals assigned to less desira-
ble experimental groups). 
122 See Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael Timpane, Introduction and Summary to ETHICAL 
AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION 1, 1 (Alice M. Rivlin & P. Michael 
Timpane eds., 1975) (introducing a collection of papers discussing the “new ethical 
and legal issues that need to be carefully examined” when testing new social policies). 
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from medical experimentation,123 where informed consent is generally 
required.124  Medical treatment to which a patient does not consent vi-
olates the patient’s bodily-integrity rights;125 the problem is not rando-
mization.  Similarly, a state could not insist that all of its citizens take a 
new drug.  Any rights that the individual has against the state constrain 
the state in legal experimentation.  For example, if a person has a right 
not to have property taken by the state,126 then the state cannot take 
that property in an experiment.  But to the extent that a government 
would be authorized to enact a policy generally, on the Lockean theory 
of implicit consent,127 there should be no ethical bar to the state’s 
enacting the policy against only a random set of individuals. 
The opposing position flows from the Kantian principle that each 
person should be treated as an end rather than only as a means.128  
 
123 Rivlin and Timpane summarize this argument as follows: 
[S]chool officials make decisions all the time that involve adoption of new 
curricula or educational approaches without firm knowledge of what the ef-
fects will be.  There is always some chance of harm to some or all children 
which has to be weighed against the possible benefits of the change.  Calling 
the change an “experiment” does not alter the moral dilemma involved or call 
for special rules.  Such rules might have the perverse effect of putting special 
obstacles in the way of careful examination and evaluation of change, while al-
lowing quite drastic changes that had no experimental or tentative flavor to 
proceed unquestioned. 
Id. at 5. 
124 See Kathryn A. Tuthill, Commentary, Human Experimentation:  Protecting Patient 
Autonomy Through Informed Consent, 18 J. LEGAL MED. 221, 221 (1997) (“The doctrine of 
informed consent requires that a physician inform a patient or research subject of the 
benefits, risks, and alternatives to medical treatment or experimental procedures be-
fore such treatment is administered.”). 
125 An early legal case insisting on informed consent frames the problem in these 
terms:  “Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine 
what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation with-
out his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages.”  
Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other 
grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957). 
126 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (requiring that private property not “be taken for 
public use, without just compensation”). 
127 See Peter G. Brown, Informed Consent in Social Experimentation:  Some Cautionary 
Notes (“‘[E]very man that hath any possession or enjoyment of any part of the domi-
nions of any government doth thereby give his tacit consent . . . .’” (quoting John 
Locke, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent and End of Civil Government, in THE 
ENGLISH PHILOSOPHERS FROM BACON TO MILL 403, 452 (Edwin A. Burtt ed., 1939))), 
in ETHICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 122, at 79, 96.   
128 See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J. 
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1785) (“Act in such a way that you always 
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simp-
ly as a means, but always at the same time as an end.” (emphasis omitted)).  
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This principle, however, does not uniquely condemn randomization.  
Suppose a jurisdiction decides to enact a new universally applicable 
policy—even though policymakers suspect that it will not be effec-
tive—because policymakers also believe it has enough of a chance of 
success to make it worth trying.  If this action counts as treating 
people as a means only, then the ethical permissibility of a new policy 
must be judged without consideration of any informational benefits 
that implementation of the policy might produce.  But many legal re-
gimes, such as patent law and securities law, are justified in part on the 
basis that they improve information.129  Information produced by a 
policy about the policy itself should not be condemned as irrelevant. 
But assuming, then, that experimentation with universally applica-
ble policies is ethical, is random policy experimentation ethical as well?  
An affirmative case focuses on the benefit of randomization—that it 
will produce better information than nonrandomized experiments.130  
Although this conclusion may at first appear to be a purely consequen-
tialist justification, Robert Veatch argues that subjects of research have 
a right not to be put “at risk in an unnecessary experiment or one inef-
ficiently designed.”131  He also notes that the Nuremberg principles on 
medical experimentation emphasized the importance of experimental 
design.132  Thus, if universal experimentation is permissible, there is an 
a fortiori argument that random experimentation must be permissible 
as well.  The difference between the universal experiment and the 
random experiment is that some people do not receive the treatment.  
Unless there is an equality right to receive the treatment,133 this differ-
ence should not make the experiment more problematic. 
Medical experimentation itself further supports the argument that 
if universal policy experiments are permissible, then randomized poli-
cy experiments must be permissible as well, because medical experi-
ments can generally be viewed as equivalents to policy experiments.  
Subjects in medical experiments who give informed consent presum-
ably would prefer a guarantee of receiving the treatment rather than 
a chance of receiving a placebo.  The status quo is a legal regime that 
constrains liberty by forbidding distribution of the treatment.  Let us 
 
129 See generally, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539 (2009) 
(discussing the patent system’s goal of encouraging disclosure of inventions). 
130 See supra Part I. 
131 Robert M. Veatch, Ethical Principles in Medical Experimentation, in ETHICAL AND 
LEGAL ISSUES OF SOCIAL EXPERIMENTATION, supra note 122, at 21, 37. 
132 Id. at 37-38. 
133 See infra subsection III.B.3. 
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assume that the legal prohibition on what Eugene Volokh has called 
“medical self-defense” is permissible.134  When the government autho-
rizes a medical experiment,135 it is effectively authorizing a new legal 
regime that permits patients to have access to a treatment.  The gov-
ernment, however, does not authorize this new legal regime in a un-
iversally applicable way; instead, it insists on randomization.  Only 
some patients will legally have access to the treatment.  It is thus 
sometimes permissible for new legal policies, including potentially 
pernicious ones, to be introduced randomly. 
This system suggests that policy randomization is permissible, at 
least so long as the group being randomized gives informed consent.  
The argument for informed consent, however, depends on the legiti-
macy of legal baselines:  both Policy X and Policy Y are, by assumption, 
legally permissible options for policymakers.  But if the current policy 
is X, then citizens may be subject to Policy Y only if they give informed 
consent, and vice versa.  The medical-experimentation context shows 
how policymakers can manipulate such baselines.  If the baseline were 
to allow patients to take a medication, then few would consent to be-
ing subjects in a legal experiment, in which they might be denied the 
right to the medicine at random (the equivalent to a medical experi-
ment in which they might receive a placebo instead of the treatment). 
Those who defend the legitimacy of medical experimentation 
must either develop an account by which baselines are permissible or 
allow legal policymakers to play the same game outside the medical 
context.  Existing randomized legal experiments generally allow sub-
jects to opt into an apparently more favorable treatment.  For exam-
ple, drug offenders may receive the option to participate in an expe-
riment in which they might be randomly assigned to a drug court.136  
 
134 Eugene Volokh, Essay, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and 
Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1815 (2007); see also Abigail Alliance for 
Better Access to Developmental Drugs v. Von Eschenbach, 495 F.3d 695, 713 (D.C. 
Cir. 2007) (en banc) (finding no constitutional right to have access to “investigational 
drugs”).  
135 Governmental involvement is necessary for at least some medical experiments.  
In the United States, the FDA reviews small-scale Phase II trials to determine whether 
to permit large-scale Phase III trials.  See, e.g., Michael D. Greenberg, AIDS, Experimental 
Drug Approval, and the FDA New Drug Screening Process, 3 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 
295, 305 (2000) (describing Phase II as “the first stage of testing at which drug efficacy 
becomes a formal consideration”). 
136 See, e.g., Denise C. Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, Research Note, The Baltimore 
City Drug Treatment Court:  One-Year Results From a Randomized Study, 39 J. RES. CRIME & 
DELINQ. 337, 343 (2002) (detailing a program in which 235 eligible clients were ran-
domly assigned either to drug court or to standard criminal processes). 
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This characteristic makes experimentation a one-way ratchet, allowing 
testing of a more lenient alternative within an existing draconian re-
gime, but not allowing testing of more draconian legal approaches.  
The only way to test the more draconian approaches would be to 
change the baseline to those approaches and then allow individuals to 
opt into an experiment in which they might receive more lenient 
treatment.  Similarly, policymakers could test raising the speed limit 
by allowing drivers to opt into a program in which they are permitted 
to drive ten miles-per-hour over the limit, but in order to test lowering 
the speed limit, policymakers would have to change the baseline.  An 
insistence on informed-consent privileges the status quo legal regime 
over alternatives—even if a universal application of neither the status 
quo nor the alternative violates any rights. 
3.  Equality Concerns 
Concerns about informed consent focus on the rights of those sub-
ject to the experiment.  Concerns about equality, on the other hand, 
focus on the rights of those who are either randomly excluded from an 
experiment or who are assigned to the less desirable of the treatment 
and control groups.  The equality concern is not limited to random 
experimentation; it extends also to cases in which a government with 
limited resources distributes those resources at random.137  For exam-
ple, governments have used lotteries to distribute scarce low-income 
housing,138 rights to immigrate,139 and positions in magnet and charter 
schools.140  Maurice Rosenberg points out that random experimenta-
tion may inevitably be in tension with the “equal protection prin-
ciple . . . that persons subjected to significantly different treatments 
must be shown to be different in ways that supply a reasonable basis for 
 
137 Such distribution has generally raised fewer objections than randomization for 
experimental purposes alone, and, as a result, experimentation has been particularly 
feasible in cases where arbitrary decisions needed to be made in any eventuality.  See 
GREENBERG ET AL., supra note 4, at 225 (noting that in one experiment, randomization 
“usually became more acceptable” when officials “recognized that they did not have 
sufficient funding to serve their entire caseload and, hence, that some mechanism was 
needed to determine who would be denied services”). 
138 See, e.g., Denise Irene Arnold, Lottery Prize Is Affordable Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 
1988, § 21 (Long Island Weekly ed.), at 12 (discussing a local housing lottery on Long 
Island). 
139 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1153(e)(2) (2006) (providing for distribution of visas for 
diversity immigrants “strictly in a random order”). 
140 See, e.g., Cullen et al., supra note 32 (analyzing such a lottery in the Chicago 
public schools). 
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the differences in treatment.”141  If equal protection is interpreted to 
prohibit all arbitrary legal differences among similarly situated individ-
uals, then both random experimentation and other programs using 
random selection to award scarce resources must be eliminated. 
There are, however, advantages to using randomization in both of 
these contexts.  In the experimental context, randomization has bene-
fits that have already been discussed,142 and when scarce resources are 
distributed, randomization ensures that the distribution occurs with-
out favor and in a way that limits rent-seeking for scarce resources.143  
In the United States, the equal protection justification for tolerating 
both random experimentation and random assignment of govern-
ment benefits is that there is a rational basis for randomization; and 
because there is no discrimination against a protected class, no higher 
standard than rational basis review is necessary.144  In the leading case 
on this issue, Judge Friendly explained, “The Equal Protection clause 
does not place a state in a vise where its only choices . . . are to do 
nothing or plunge into statewide action.” 145  A court someday might 
fail to follow or even overturn this precedent, but for now the 
precedent reinforces the plausibility of the legal argument that ran-
domization does not violate the Equal Protection Clause.146 
But does randomization of legal requirements violate the core 
principles of equal protection?  A full philosophical treatment of this 
question is beyond this Article’s scope, but Ronald Dworkin’s treat-
ment of a related issue deserves attention.  Dworkin considers the legi-
timacy of “checkerboard statutes.”147  “Why should Parliament,” he asks, 
 
141 Maurice Rosenberg, The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of 
Justice, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1988, at 13, 16. 
142 See supra Part II. 
143 Rent-seeking can still occur if large numbers of individuals spend money to 
enter the lottery.  See, e.g., Thomas W. Hazlett & Robert J. Michaels, The Cost of Rent-
Seeking:  Evidence from Cellular Telephone License Lotteries, 59 S. ECON. J. 425, 425 (1993) 
(analyzing government lotteries for cellular-telephone licenses that led to over 
320,000 applications). 
144 For a landmark case explaining rational basis review under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause, see Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
145 Aguayo v. Richardson, 473 F.2d 1090, 1109-10 (2d Cir. 1973).  One commenta-
tor has criticized the court for not indicating that its decision would be valid only for as 
long as the “value of the program remained uncertain.”  Note, Reforming the One Step at 
a Time Justification in Equal Protection Cases, 90 YALE L.J. 1777, 1783 (1981). 
146 Randomization schemes, however, may sometimes violate other constitutional 
provisions.  See, e.g., Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (finding random 
stops of vehicles to check drivers’ licenses and registrations inconsistent with the 
Fourth Amendment). 
147 RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 178-84 (1986).  
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“not make abortion criminal for pregnant women who were born in 
even years but not for those born in odd ones?”148  Dworkin imagines 
such a distinction arising from compromise, never considering the 
possibility that a checkerboard statute might produce useful informa-
tion.  The discussion nevertheless is useful in addressing whether arbi-
trary distinctions inherently violate equality principles.149  Dworkin 
claims that checkerboard statutes offend a principle that he calls “inte-
grity.”150  A jurisdiction enacting such a statute as a compromise “must 
endorse principles to justify part of what it has done that it must reject 
to justify the rest.”151  That requirement does not occur with random 
experimentation, where a single principle—the need to obtain more 
information—justifies both the treatment and control conditions.152 
Dworkin’s concern is that randomness seems arbitrary, but arbi-
trariness is often more troubling when it is nonrandom.  Consider, for 
example, the different approaches of Justice Stewart and Justice Mar-
shall in Furman v. Georgia153 to the question of whether the death pe-
nalty is so capricious as to deny due process.  Justice Stewart criticized 
a state’s criminal system because “of all the people convicted of [capi-
tal crimes], many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners [in 
Furman were] among a capriciously selected random handful upon 
whom the sentence of death has in fact been imposed.”154  Justice Mar-
shall, meanwhile, observed that “[i]t also is evident that the burden of 
capital punishment falls upon the poor, the ignorant, and the under-
privileged members of society.”155  If Justice Marshall was correct (and 
there is abundant evidence that he was)156 in claiming that the death 
 
148 Id. at 178. 
149 See id. at 185 (relating the checkerboard statute issue to conceptions of equality). 
150 Id. at 183-84. 
151 Id. at 184. 
152 Another example of Dworkin’s reaffirms that arbitrary distinctions are accepta-
ble where they are not simply the result of legislative compromise:  “Suppose we can 
rescue only some prisoners of tyranny; justice hardly requires rescuing none even 
when only luck, not any principle, will decide whom we save and whom we leave to tor-
ture.”  Id. at 181. 
153 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam). 
154 Id. at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 293 
(Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t smacks of little more than a lottery system.”); id. at 309 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same 
way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual.”); id. at 313 (White, J., concur-
ring) (“[T]here is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it is 
imposed from the many cases in which it is not.”). 
155 Id. at 365-66 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
156 See DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., EQUAL JUSTICE AND THE DEATH PENALTY 133 
(1990) (concluding from the data in their empirical study that “excessive sentences 
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penalty is disproportionately visited upon the “poor, the ignorant, and 
the underprivileged,” then Justice Stewart cannot be right in alleging 
that the death sentence is randomly assigned.  Justice Marshall’s con-
cern resonates with ex ante equal protection concerns because citi-
zens are treated differently from the very beginning as a result of arbi-
trary characteristics.  Justice Stewart’s concern instead resonates with 
an ex post equal protection perspective.  Truly random application of 
law provides each citizen with ex ante equality—an equal chance of 
being assigned to the same legal rules.  A constitutional or moral con-
cern with truly random application of law instead turns on arbitrarily 
treating equal people differently ex post. 
Many observers of the legal system may have a more visceral, nega-
tive reaction to ex-post randomness than to ex-ante randomness.  Jus-
tice O’Connor, in Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodard, expressed a 
concern with a hypothetical clemency procedure:  “Judicial interven-
tion might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme where-
by a state official flipped a coin to determine whether to grant cle-
mency . . . .”157  This kind of language suggests that courts might be 
hostile to a truly random application of the law.  The New York State 
Commission on Judicial Conduct in 1982 served a complaint on Alan 
I. Friess, a Manhattan Criminal Court judge for, among other things, 
deciding in open court between a twenty- and thirty-day criminal sen-
tence by flipping a coin.158  More recently, the Virginia Supreme Court 
similarly removed trial judge James Michael Shull from office for, 
among other things, determining custody rights for a Christmas holi-
day by flipping a coin.159  The Supreme Court rejected Judge Shull’s 
rationale that the probabilistic decision was an attempt “to encourage 
the litigants to resolve the custody issues by themselves.”160  Federal 
Judge Gregory A. Presnell similarly used randomization as “a new 
form of alternative dispute resolution” when he ordered two attorneys 
 
most likely result from suspect and illegitimate factors, such as the race and socioeco-
nomic status of the defendant or the victim, or, perhaps, other idiosyncratic factors”). 
157 523 U.S. 272, 289 (1998) (O’Connor, J., concurring).   
158 See In re Friess, 457 N.Y.S.2d 33, 34-35 (1982) (denying severance of the charge 
against Judge Friess for coin-flipping from a charge that he resolved a different dispute 
“by submitting it to a show of hands by spectators in the courtroom”).  
159 See Judicial Inquiry & Review Comm’n v. Shull, 651 S.E.2d 648, 658 (Va. 2007) 
(removing Judge Shull for several instances of misconduct, including coin-flipping as well 
as ordering a victim of domestic abuse to show wounds on her thigh in court and making 
an “improper ex parte telephone call”); see also Gary Slapper, Weird Cases:  Justice by Coin-
Toss, TIMES ONLINE (London), Nov. 16, 2007, http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/ 
business/law/article2882090.ece (describing the Friess and Shull cases). 
160 Shull, 651 S.E.2d at 652. 
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to resolve a deposition-location dispute by playing a game of rock-
paper-scissors.161 
While many people are viscerally appalled by the notion of judges 
flipping coins to decide legal issues, coin flipping need not be a mean-
ingless ritual.  In particular contexts, there are a variety of public poli-
cy rationales for randomized decisions.  It is not clear whether Judge 
Shull was sincere in claiming that his coin flipping over child custody 
was an attempt to promote private dispute resolution.  But the ratio-
nale is not implausible.  Indeed, one of us has shown that probabilisti-
cally dividing an entitlement by randomly giving it to one disputant or 
another can in fact promote private settlement.162  Disputants bargain-
ing in the shadow of probabilistically divided, Solomonic rights have 
powerful incentives to speak more honestly with each other—and they 
therefore may be more likely to settle a dispute before the actual coin 
flip,163 just as the lawyers in the deposition dispute resolved their dis-
pute before having to play rock-paper-scissors on the courthouse 
steps.164  Moreover, in the context of child custody, Jon Elster has prof-
fered an independent rationale for resolving custody disputes by coin 
flipping.165  Elster argues that probabilistically assigning custody in 
close cases is valuable because the state does not tell the child that one 
 
161 Adam Liptak, Lawyers Won’t End Squabble, So Judge Turns to Child’s Play, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 9, 2006, at A19.  Liptak further reported that “[c]hildish lawyers are com-
monplace, but the use of children’s games to resolve litigation disputes is apparently a 
new development.”  Id.; see also Jeralyn E. Merritt, The “Rock, Paper, Scissors” Judge, TALK-
LEFT ( June 9, 2006, 5:06:39 AM), http://www.talkleft.com/story/2006/06/09/305/ 
45461 (defending Judge Presnell’s acumen in the wake of the rock-paper-scissors story). 
162 See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining:  Dividing a Legal Entitlement to 
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1073-78 (1995) (demonstrating that award-
ing property rights probabilistically is efficient given that all parties have knowledge of 
the court’s probability distribution). 
163 Solomonic entitlements have an “information-forcing” effect on ex ante bar-
gaining because disputants are no longer simply buyers or sellers.  In traditional nego-
tiations, sellers overstate their valuations, and buyers understate their valuations, mak-
ing it difficult to discover all instances of value-enhancing trade.  But in the shadow of 
randomized asset allocation, it is possible for plaintiffs to enter into two different kinds 
of settlement:  one where they buy the defendants’ probabilistic entitlements and one 
where they sell their own probabilistic entitlements.  The offsetting incentives to over-
state value as a seller and understate value as a buyer lead to more forthright and effi-
cient negotiations.  See id. at 1045-47 (discussing the information-forcing effect of un-
tailored liability rules); see also Peter Cramton et al., Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, 
55 ECONOMETRICA 615, 626 (1987) (arguing that a “simple bidding game” can 
“achieve[]” an “ex post efficient allocation” of assets when dissolving a partnership).   
164 See Liptak, supra note 161 (noting that the lawyers agreed to meet prior to play-
ing the game). 
165 See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS:  STUDIES IN THE LIMITATION OF RA-
TIONALITY 170-72  (1989) (discussing arguments for and against coin-flipping).  
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parent is marginally better than the other.166  For Elster, publicly stat-
ing that the mother or father is the marginally better Christmas cus-
todian may not be in the best interest of the child.167 
Judicial antipathy to randomized decisions is at its highest with 
regard to decisionmaking in criminal cases.  But even here, it is not 
difficult to conjure public policy rationales for coin-flipping sentences.  
It is elementary economics that probabilistically uncertain sentences 
will have a greater deterrence effect with regard to risk-averse defen-
dants than will certain sentences.168  New York State might get a bigger 
bang for its incarceration buck if it followed Judge Friess and flipped 
coins for twenty- and thirty-day sentences instead of sentencing every-
one to twenty-five days.169  This deterrence result is, however, reversed 
for risk-preferring criminals, and it is thus reassuring that Judge Friess, 
before flipping, asked the defendant if he was a “gambling man.”170  
But to our minds, an even stronger rationale for randomization—even 
with regard to criminal sentencing—is to promote learning.  After cen-
turies of experience, we still do not have definitive evidence on wheth-
er longer sentences rehabilitate or harden criminals.171  Justice 
O’Connor is appalled by the idea of clemency by chance, and ran-
domness applied in a single case seems unlikely to produce useful in-
 
166 See id. at 171 (“One may well imagine a coin-tossing problem coming to symbol-
ize the equal worth of the parents . . . .”); see also Adam M. Samaha, Randomization in 
Adjudication, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 20-21, 29-30 (2009) (discussing Elster’s argu-
ment in more detail).   
167 See Samaha, supra note 166, at 29 (explaining that Judge Brown “faced a choice 
that other judges might have decided on questionable grounds—for example, by a tie-
breaking preference for older couples over fathers, or vice versa”).  
168 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law 2 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9698, 2003), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9698.pdf (arguing that if parties are risk averse, then it 
may be “socially beneficial” to impose lesser sanctions than if the parties are risk neutral).   
169 Cf. David Lewis, The Punishment That Leaves Something to Chance, 18 PHIL. & PUB. 
AFF. 53, 58-62 (1989) (defending punishments where the severity is randomized, en 
route to justifying harsher penalties for those who, by coincidence, cause more harm); 
Florynce Kennedy, Letter to the Editor, For Whom the Coin Is Tossed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
1982, at 24 (comparing Judge Friess’s coin toss to other intrinsic uncertainties in the 
judicial system). 
170 Slapper, supra note 159.  However, the coin toss’s general deterrent effect de-
pends less on whether the particular defendant being sentenced likes to gamble than 
on whether a prospective criminal is risk preferring or risk averse.  See supra note 168 
and accompanying text. 
171 For an argument that longer sentences have minimal deterrent effect, see John 
M. Darley, On the Unlikely Prospect of Reducing Crime Rates by Increasing the Severity of Prison 
Sentences, 13 J.L. & POL’Y 189 (2005). 
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formation.172  There might, however, be value in randomly granting 
clemency and parole to inmates selected at random to see if, in fact, 
they have a higher recidivism rate than do those who are not selected.173 
The informational rationale for randomization also acts as a prin-
ciple for deciding when not to test and when to stop testing.  We 
should not allow randomized tests of parachutes174 because we already 
have strong evidence that they are effective.  And it is standard proto-
col to shut down medical trials early if it becomes clear that either the 
control or treatment therapy is superior.175  The case for randomized 
testing is at its strongest when the evidence is truly in equipoise about 
which of two policies is the best.  It is analytically convenient to con-
trast extreme examples of knowledge (as in the parachute example) 
and ignorance (as in the concept of evidentiary equipoise).  But in 
many cases, existing evidence does not compel the conclusion that ei-
ther the treatment or the control is more likely to be effective.176  In-
deed, even if we start in a position of evidentiary equipoise, as any 
randomized trial proceeds, the very process of learning destroys the 
equipoise and creates the vexing problem of partial information.177  
Notwithstanding the supposed requirements of informed consent, 
medical trials routinely fail to give participants the best current infor-
 
172 See supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
173 Cf. Jeffrey R. Kling et al., Experimental Analysis of Neighborhood Effects, 75 ECONO-
METRICA 83, 84 (2007) (analyzing a “randomized experiment in which some families 
living in high-poverty U.S. housing projects were offered . . . housing vouchers . . . while 
others were not”).   
174 See Gordon C.S. Smith & Jill P. Pell, Parachute Use to Prevent Death and Major 
Trauma Related to Gravitational Challenge:  Systematic Review of Randomised Controlled Tri-
als, 327 BMJ 1459, 1460 (2003) (noting ironically that “[t]he basis for parachute use is 
purely observational, and its apparent efficacy could potentially be explained by a 
‘healthy cohort’ effect”).  
175 See Sarah J.L. Edwards et al., The Ethics of Randomised Controlled Trials from the 
Perspectives of Patients, the Public, and Health Care Professionals, 317 BMJ 1209, 1209 (1998) 
(“The scientific rationale for conducting a trial rests in collective equipoise, which 
means that the medical community as a whole is genuinely uncertain over which 
treatment is best.”). 
176 Moreover, from an efficiency perspective, it is sometimes cost effective to test 
and eliminate low-probability therapies that might teach us a great deal.  See Wallace, 
supra note 53, at 434 (explaining that “unacceptably large variances together with large 
expenses in obtaining more information in the form of additional sample data dictate 
the need for restrictions on parameters”); Martin L. Weitzman, Optimal Search for the 
Best Alternative, 47 ECONOMETRICA 641, 649 (1979) (“The purpose of the model formu-
lated in this paper is to sharply characterize [the] optimal search among alternative 
sources with different characteristics.”).  
177 See Richard J. Lilford & Jennifer Jackson, Equipoise and the Ethics of Randomiza-
tion, 88 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 552, 554-55 (1995) (discussing the implication of partial 
information on informed consent). 
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mation about the likely result of the trial.178  The reason for the failure 
is to keep patients participating.  Patient surveys indicate, unsurpri-
singly, that “[w]illingness to undergo randomisation drops as prospec-
tive participants are given more preliminary data and as they are made 
aware of any accumulating evidence of effectiveness.”179 
IV.  GUIDELINES AND APPLICATIONS 
We saw in Part II that even with the best statistical tools, it is often 
difficult to make inferences about causality from nonrandomized poli-
cy changes.  Randomization generally makes interpretation much easi-
er, even though, as we saw in Part III, randomized experiments can be 
difficult to interpret.  Given these concerns, this Part develops some 
general guidelines for randomized experimentation, describes how 
legislatures and administrative agencies might initiate randomized stu-
dies, and offers some specific applications of randomizing law. 
A.  General Guidelines 
In many respects, randomized experiments should conform to or-
dinary principles of experimentation.  For example, the sample should 
be large enough to generate meaningful results.180  There is no magic 
number for all experiments; a small number of observations may be 
enough if the measured effect of the intervention is anticipated to be 
large, but a large number may be needed for small anticipated meas-
ured effects.  The more observations, the better the chance that any ac-
tual effect will be correctly identified as existing at any particular thre-
shold of statistical significance.  Policymakers need not, however, 
choose any particular level of statistical significance, such as 0.05, as a 
threshold for identifying an experiment as a success.  Statisticians have 
long recognized these thresholds as arbitrary.181 
 
178 Cf. Edwards et al., supra note 175, at 1209 (“Most doctors expressed willingness 
to enter their patients in trials even when the treatments offered were widely available 
but were not an equal bet prospectively . . . .”). 
179 Id.  Patients might be more willing to accept randomization if they knew that 
the trial would increase their probability of getting the more effective therapy.  But 
when one therapy is known to be more likely effective, self-interested patients would 
prefer to receive 100% of that therapy.    
180 See, e.g., Duflo et al., supra note 86, at 3918-28 (discussing the issue of sample 
size in randomized experiments). 
181 But see Lester V. Manderscheid, Significance Levels—0.05, 0.01, or ?, 47 J. FARM 
ECON. 1381, 1381 (1965) (urging that the level of statistical significance employed in 
a particular experiment is “not arbitrary but rather is, or at least should be, a delibe-
rate choice”). 
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Meanwhile, policymakers must consider the unit of analysis at 
which randomization occurs.182  If randomization is at the jurisdiction-
al or institutional level, then even if there are many affected individu-
als or entities, the number of independent observations is the number 
of separately randomized units.  Statistical analysis could be used to 
assess individual responses to policies, but only at the risk of reintro-
ducing omitted variable bias.  Finally, to reduce attrition bias, policy-
makers should generally use matched samples, with matching occur-
ring before the experiment on all available variables.183 
A final—but more controversial—design suggestion is to avoid 
problems of self-selection and attrition by making participation man-
datory.  Social experiments to date have largely been opt-in, allowing 
individuals to choose whether to participate and then, perhaps, wheth-
er to opt out.184  This practice is not surprising given the conventional 
view of social experimentation as a form of academic research.  Aca-
demics cannot experiment on research subjects without informed con-
sent.185  But governments—at least in theory—could make participation 
in a randomized experiment mandatory (just as they have done with 
the draft lotteries), and they could even institute reporting require-
ments.  There will always be some people who ignore the rules and 
some unavoidable attrition, due to factors like emigration and death.  
But a government could either not count such individuals (and their 
matches) or develop some other convention for how to count them.186 
After accounting for experimental implementation costs, which 
are fixed, one should find that the threshold for implementing an ex-
periment should be lower than the threshold for enacting new poli-
cies.  While policies apply to everyone indefinitely, the direct effects of 
 
182 See, e.g., Duflo et al., supra note 86, at 3929-30 (“An important practical design 
is whether to randomize the intervention at the level of the individual, the family, the 
village, the district, etc.”). 
183 See supra note 106 and accompanying text (discussing the use of matched 
samples). 
184 See generally Rivlin & Timpane, supra note 122 (discussing a wide range of ex-
periments).   
185 See generally Tuthill, supra note 124, at 221-46 (providing an overview of law 
concerning informed-consent requirements in medical experimentation). 
186 The convention might depend on context.  For example, in an experiment on 
securities disclosure, the bankruptcy of a corporation could count as stock price declin-
ing to zero.  An individual’s death might count as a bad result in a health care policy 
experiment but could simply be ignored in an experiment on fee shifting in court cases.  
More generally, it is possible to estimate intent-to-treat effects that look at the impact of 
treatment offers or attempts, regardless of whether the subjects comply.  See supra notes 
111-14 and accompanying text (discussing the “intent-to-treat methodology”). 
ABRAMOWICZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:47 PM 
976 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 159: 929 
experiments apply to only a subset of the population for a discrete pe-
riod of time.  As a result, the downside of implementing an experi-
mental policy is much lower than the downside of an ordinary policy, 
implying that the threshold for experimental policy implementation is 
lower than the threshold for permanent enactment.  Moreover, the 
informational value of an experiment is higher than the informational 
value of ordinary policy enactment.  Experiments allow for better 
identification of the causal effects of policies than do ordinary policy 
changes.  When the policy environment does not change radically 
over time, the information from the experiment yields benefits over a 
long period.  Randomized experiments thus provide uniquely accu-
rate information with long-lasting value. 
A policy can be randomly assigned at many different levels of ran-
domization.  Some policies can be randomly assigned at the individual 
level.  This level of randomization is familiar from the pharmaceutical 
industry.  In a drug trial, some individual subjects are given the expe-
rimental drug, while other individuals who serve as controls receive 
the drug that constitutes the existing state-of-the-art treatment.187  Si-
milarly, individuals can be randomized into different policies.  For ex-
ample, Medicare’s prescription drug program, “Part D,” randomly as-
signed more than six million people to one of up to twenty qualified 
state plans.188  Recipients were free to opt out, but the legal default for 
the individual was chosen at random. 
In other cases, randomization may take place at a different level of 
generality.  It makes little sense, for example, to test some securities 
disclosure rules by randomly assigning individuals to different disclo-
sure regimes.  Instead, the policymaker would probably randomly as-
sign firms to different disclosure regimes and observe how the differ-
ent disclosure regimes affect firm outcomes.  Alternatively, different 
jurisdictions might be assigned to different policies, with the same pol-
icy applying to each individual within a jurisdiction.  If we wanted to 
examine the effect of different speed limits, for example, it would 
theoretically be possible to randomly assign every driver in the juris-
diction to a different speed limit and observe the outcome.  But in-
stead of giving each individual a different speed limit, policymakers 
could give different municipalities, counties, or states each a different 
 
187 This type of experiment is known as an “active-control trial.”  See, e.g., Sharona 
Hoffman, The Use of Placebos in Clinical Trials: Responsible Research or Unethical Practice?, 
33 CONN. L. REV. 449, 459 (2001) (distinguishing these trials from true placebo trials). 
188 See RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE 160-62 (2008) (explaining 
the main features of Medicare Part D).  
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speed limit, with a given limit applying to all individuals within the 
corresponding jurisdiction. 
So how should policymakers determine the appropriate level of 
randomization?  We believe the appropriate level of randomization is 
the smallest scale that still leaves interactions between the treated and 
untreated groups at a minimum.  We generally prefer more fine-
grained units of randomization if we are theoretically confident that 
the policy treatment will not impact the untreated group.  When a 
policy targets individual incentives and has no “externalities”—effects 
that extend beyond an individual—then the treatment should be ran-
domly assigned at the individual level.  For example, if (counterfac-
tually) individual driving patterns did not affect others, then different 
speed limits should be randomly assigned to different individuals.  As-
signing speed limits to broader-level jurisdictions under these condi-
tions gains no benefit and limits the power of an experiment because 
it is much more costly to add observations.189  Thus, random assign-
ment to individuals would be the best strategy when a policy targets 
individual outcomes and there are no spillovers to other (untreated) 
individuals.  However, in this driving example, it is probable that ran-
domized speed limits may affect the driving patterns of the untreated 
drivers.  There might generally be more accidents for both treated 
and untreated drivers if they drive at different speeds on the same 
highway.  Drivers in the control group might be induced to drive 
more aggressively if they witness subject-group drivers going faster.  
Because of the strong possibility of these types of spillovers between 
the treated and untreated groups, it would be more appropriate to 
randomize speed limits at the jurisdiction level. 
Randomization at the firm level is often the appropriate unit of 
analysis when analyzing policies that are dominantly targeted toward 
affecting firm behavior.  Accordingly, randomized tests of corporate 
and securities law should often be implemented by randomly treating 
individual firms.  But analogous concerns about spillover effects on 
untreated firms apply here as well.  If treated firms are required to 
comply with an inefficient rule, then we should expect that untreated 
firms that need not comply with the rule would have a competitive ad-
 
189 When policy is randomized at the state level, for example, “serial correlation” in 
error terms makes standard errors wide and therefore complicates the finding of statis-
tically significant policy impacts.  For details, see Marianne Bertrand et al., How Much 
Should We Trust Differences-in-Differences Estimates?, 119 Q.J. ECON. 249, 249-61 (2004).  
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vantage.190  In equilibrium, we would expect the untreated firms to 
change their behavior:  faced with weaker competitors, the untreated 
firms might increase their price or change the quality of their prod-
uct.  We might even see the advantaged, untreated firms expand their 
market share and stock price because of “losing” the treatment lottery.  
At times, the treatment-induced shift in market share may be relevant 
to evaluating the legal treatment itself.  When the outcome in ques-
tion concerns dimensions of social welfare that are not fully felt by the 
firms and their customers, however, the impact of the treatment on 
the untreated firm’s behavior may undermine analysts’ ability to parse 
the true causal mechanism.  The presence of intra-industry competi-
tive spillovers will often militate toward randomizing at the industry, 
instead of the firm, level. 
After choosing the experimental population, experimenters must 
choose the appropriate duration for the experiment.  Longer experi-
mental periods offer some obvious advantages.  A longer period in-
creases the chance that the involved parties will become aware of the 
experiment and thus reduces the ability of the parties to avoid expe-
rimental effects by delaying behavior until the experiment is com-
pleted.  Both factors mean that longer periods are more likely to pro-
vide better estimates of the true effects of an experimental policy than 
are shorter periods.  At the same time, however, long-term experi-
ments exacerbate the inequalities that experimentation creates.  In 
addition, experimental policies will often prove to be failures, and 
lengthening the term of the experiment raises the cost of these fail-
ures.  In total, the experimental period should be the shortest period 
necessary to obtain reasonably representative estimates of the true ef-
fects of the experimental policy. 
In some circumstances, the length of the experiment will be con-
tingent on the interim results of the experiment itself.  As in drug test-
ing, if the interim results point to a clear conclusion, it may be appro-
priate to shut down the study earlier than expected.191  Once it 
 
190 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules:  Efficiency and Distribution 
in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361, 372-85 (1991) (discussing the market 
impact of efficient and inefficient mandates); see also Christine Jolls, Accommodation 
Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 230-72 (2000) (considering the efficiency of mandates 
intended to accommodate the special needs of population subgroups). 
191 For example, the National Institutes of Health shut down a study of the impact 
of circumcision on HIV infection rates in Africa when it discovered that circumcision 
had a significant protective effect.  See Donald D. McNeil, Jr., Circumcision’s Anti-AIDS 
Effect Found Greater than First Thought, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2007, at A3 (noting that “two 
clinical trials were stopped . . . because the results were so clear”). 
ABRAMOWICZ REVISED FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2011  12:47 PM 
2011] Randomizing Law 979 
becomes clear that one treatment is preferred to another, it is immor-
al and inefficient to expose subjects capriciously to the inferior policy.  
On the other hand, in some circumstances it will be appropriate to ex-
tend the length of the experiment to gather more information.  In 
multilevel randomized testing, for example, follow-up testing of un-
tested permutations may be warranted.  Still, in other contexts it may 
be appropriate to continue the testing, but to alter the probable as-
signments of the different policy treatments.  Google AdWords pro-
vides a potential example of this form of “convexification” in the con-
text of Internet advertisements.  If a randomized experiment initially 
suggests that, for example, “Tastes Great” is a more successful beer ad 
than “Less Filling,” the Google software could automatically start in-
creasing the probability that people will see the more successful adver-
tisement.192  This method—called “outcome-adaptive randomization”—
mitigates the inefficiency of additional testing and allows the research-
er to continue to collect some information on the longer-term effects 
of the various policy treatments.193 
B.  Institution-Specific Guidelines 
The precise workings and advantages of randomized experimenta-
tion may differ greatly depending on whether a legislature or an ad-
ministrative agency designs an experiment.  Administrative law doc-
trine should tolerate the launch of randomized experiments, and 
once randomization becomes more common, an executive order 
might insist that agencies systematically consider what policies should 
be randomized.  Meanwhile, there is a danger that legislators will ig-
nore even solid evidence produced by randomized experiments, and 
this concern produces an argument for self-executing randomized ex-
periments—where policy outcomes hinge directly on experimental re-
sults in a way specified in statutes.  Agencies, by contrast, are less likely 
simply to ignore experimental results. 
 
192 For more information on Google AdWords, see supra note 118.    
193 See, e.g., Ying Kuen Cheng et al., Continuous Bayesian Adaptive Randomization 
Based on Event Times with Covariates, 25 STAT. MED. 55, 56 (2006) (“[O]utcome-adaptive 
randomization . . . uses the data from patients treated previously in the trial to unbal-
ance the randomization probabilities in favour of the treatment . . . observed to have 
comparatively superior outcomes.  [It] provides a compromise between ethical con-
cerns and the scientific goal of obtaining unbiased treatment comparisons.”). 
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1.  Administrative Agencies:  The Case for a  
Randomization Impact Statement 
Sometimes, as in the Medicare experiment, an agency may con-
duct an experiment as the result of a legislative decree, but it is also 
possible that an agency itself could decide to randomize policies.  The 
courts would presumably examine such a decision with the usual tools 
of judicial review of administrative decisions, ensuring, for example, 
that the action was procedurally proper,194 consistent with the law,195 
and representative of a permissible policy judgment.196 
These hurdles should be straightforward for an agency to clear.  
As long as an agency goes through the ordinary notice-and-comment 
process—including providing a detailed explanation of an experi-
ment’s purpose in the notice of proposed rulemaking,197 as well as a 
“concise, general statement” of basis and purpose198—there should be 
no procedural obstacle to proceeding with an experiment that would 
change the law for certain entities.  As long as neither the experimen-
tal legal regime nor the control legal regime is inconsistent with the 
agency’s governing statute, a decision to launch an experiment should 
present no problem under Chevron review.  Perhaps the most signifi-
cant obstacle would be hard-look review, in which a court would ex-
amine the agency’s justification for creating the experiment.199  But 
 
194 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (setting forth procedural requirements for  
notice-and-comment rulemaking by administrative agencies). 
195 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-
45 (1984) (setting forth the contemporary standard of judicial review for evaluating 
agency interpretations of congressional mandates). 
196 See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to “hold unlawful and set aside 
agency action . . . found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law”). 
197 Id. § 553(b) (requiring publication in the Federal Register of “general notice of 
proposed rulemaking” in most cases).  Agencies often seek to meet the general notice 
requirement by publishing the actual rules they are considering, though even this level 
of notice is sometimes inadequate.  See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass’n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 
F.2d 375, 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (remanding a case noting that the “record reveals a lack 
of an adequate opportunity . . . to comment on the proposed standards, due to the ab-
sence of disclosure of the detailed findings and procedures of the tests”).    
198 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (requiring an agency to provide opportunity for comment by 
interested persons and to issue a “concise general statement of basis and purpose”).  
“Concise” and “general” are sometimes interpreted to mean “detailed” and “specific.”  
See, e.g., Auto. Parts & Accessories Ass’n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968) 
(warning against an “overly literal” interpretation of these words). 
199 See, e.g., Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 
1970) (“Its supervisory function calls on the court to intervene . . . if the court becomes 
aware . . . that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, 
and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making.” (footnote omitted)). 
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hard-look review is supposed to be deferential,200 and an agency 
should be able to justify employing a randomized experiment on the 
ground that this approach could provide information relevant to the 
administrative process. 
Indeed, an administrative agency should receive broader latitude 
to create an experiment than to create a new administrative regime 
without an experiment.  Procedurally, an agency might argue that it 
should not have to go through the notice-and-comment procedure to 
establish an experiment,201 because the experiment is merely designed 
to produce data from which to make a subsequent policy decision.  
Courts have been hesitant to allow agencies to avoid the notice-and-
comment process for temporary rules,202 perhaps in part because this 
compromise would allow an administrative agency to renew a program 
indefinitely.203  An agency should, however, at least be allowed to focus 
solely on the reason for conducting the experiment, rather than res-
ponding to comments on the merits of the underlying policy issue.  
Because an experiment produces data on a policy issue, courts should 
not require an agency to show that existing data already justifies the 
policy that the experiment is designed to test. 
 
200 See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (“The scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is 
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.”).  
201 This loosening of the requirement might occur when Congress has explicitly 
instructed an agency to conduct an experiment.  Even here, however, the agency is 
likely to notify the public of its intent to run an experiment.  For example, it may soli-
cit third parties to perform the experiment.  See, e.g., Solicitation for Proposals for the 
Demonstration Project for Disease Management for Severely Chronically Ill Medicare 
Beneficiaries with Congestive Heart Failure, Diabetes, and Coronary Heart Disease, 67 
Fed. Reg. 8267, 8269 (Feb. 22, 2002) (soliciting “applications for demonstration 
projects that use disease management, along with coverage of prescription drugs, to 
improve the quality of services furnished to specific beneficiaries and to manage ex-
penditures under Parts A and B of the Medicare program”). 
202 The Administrative Procedure Act includes a general exemption from the no-
tice-and-comment process “when the agency for good cause finds . . . that notice and 
public procedure thereon are impracticable, unnecessary, or contrary to the public 
interest.”  5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(B).  But the courts have found that the temporary nature 
of a rule is not enough to escape notice-and-comment.  See, e.g., Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co. 
v. FERC, 969 F.2d 1141, 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (“‘[T]he limited nature of the rule can-
not in itself justify a failure to follow notice and comment procedures.’” (quoting 
Council of the S. Mountains, Inc. v. Donovan, 653 F.2d 573, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1981))). 
203 But see Juan J. Lavilla, The Good Cause Exemption to Notice and Comment Rulemaking 
Requirements Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 3 ADMIN. L.J. 317, 377-78 (1989) 
(suggesting that courts treat a rule’s temporary nature as a factor in determining 
whether it falls under the “good cause” exception in § 553(b)(B)). 
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To enact an experimental policy permanently, an agency presum-
ably would face hard-look review, but here too courts should be more 
deferential than usual.  Critics of the notice-and-comment process 
complain that it has “ossified” the rulemaking process,204 making it too 
cumbersome to effect change.  A response to this objection is that de-
manding review by the courts ensures that an agency does not pursue 
an idiosyncratic, ideological agenda.205  But an agency conducting an 
experiment is less likely to be following an ideological agenda than an 
agency drawing inferences based on existing data that might plausibly 
support a variety of conclusions.  Moreover, courts conducting judicial 
review should recognize the unique value of evidence from rando-
mized experimentation.206  There remains a danger that an agency 
might make invalid inferences on the basis of an experiment.  At least 
when experiments provide the best available evidence on a policy issue, 
however, courts should allow an agency to reply that it placed more 
weight on the experimental evidence, without chronicling all of the 
problems of nonexperimental evidence on a case-by-case basis. 
If individual agency initiatives begin to test and choose policies 
with experimental means, randomization could gradually become a 
more entrenched part of the policymaking process.  Perhaps, consi-
dering randomization might become almost as routine and forma-
lized as a cost-benefit analysis.207  For example, the executive branch 
could provide a standard procedure for agencies to consider rando-
mization and to produce a randomization impact statement (RIS) 
when enacting a new rule—regardless of whether the agency decided 
to use a randomized approach. 
An RIS might include the following elements: 
 
 
204 Thomas O. McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 
DUKE L.J. 1385, 1438 (1992); see also Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Seven Ways to Deossify Agency 
Rulemaking, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 59, 61 (1995) (observing that even though agencies should 
try to keep up with scientific and technological advances, “agencies rarely amend rules 
because the amendment process is as daunting as the process of promulgating a rule”). 
205 An ideological agency facing an ideologically hostile court might respond ei-
ther by investing more in meeting the requirements of the hard-look doctrine or by 
“allocat[ing] their resources to other projects where the payoffs to the agency are 
greater.”  Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 
VA. L. REV. 1717, 1770 (1997). 
206 Cf. Dorf & Sabel, supra note 2, at 397 (arguing that hard-look review should re-
ward experimental agency approaches with greater deference (though not focusing 
specifically on random experimentation)). 
207 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 639 (1994), reprinted as amended in 5 
U.S.C. 601 (2006) (permitting regulation only where benefits exceed costs). 
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1.  The impetus for conducting a policy experiment.  It will be particular-
ly important to delineate the particular predicted outcomes or conse-
quences that motivate the proposed change.  If no experiment was 
conducted, an explanation of the experiment’s absence should be 
provided.  Valid explanations for the absence of an experiment would 
include a de minimis exception, overwhelming evidence about the 
policy’s desirability, an urgent need for a new policy, or the impossi-
bility of conducting a truly informative experiment.  In some circum-
stances, it will prove difficult to measure quantitatively the informa-
tion about the impacts of interest or to do so in a timely fashion.  At 
other times, it will prove impossible to reach a consensus about how to 
weigh the importance of various impacts.  For example, we imagine 
that a randomized experiment looking at the impact of a spousal-
notification requirement for abortion might do little (even if such a 
test were constitutionally permissible)208 to resolve the legislative de-
bate because legislators and their constituent groups may have in-
commensurable preferences.209 
 
2.  A detailed description of the experiment.  The description should 
discuss the unit of randomization, the scope and length of the expe-
riment, and the anticipated possible effects of the experimental policy 
on different outcome measures. 
 
3.  A summary of the results of the experiment.  The summary should 
reflect not only the agency’s examination of the data the experiments 
 
208 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 898 (1992) (striking 
down a Pennsylvania spousal-notification law).  But a state might experiment with of-
fering couples at the time of marriage the option of contracting for spousal notifica-
tion.  See Andrew Blair-Stanek, Comment, Default and Choices in the Marriage Contract:  
How to Increase Autonomy, Encourage Discussion, and Circumvent Constitutional Constraints, 
24 TOURO L. REV. 31, 49-51 (2008). 
209 Then again, some moderate legislators might be swayed by compelling evi-
dence about the impact of notification law on (1) a woman’s propensity to abort; (2) 
the propensity of those who would have otherwise been aborted fetuses to commit 
crime; and (3) the probable psychological well-being of the spouses.   Cf. Donohue & 
Levitt, supra note 61, at 380 (2001) (“[W]e consider a novel explanation for the sud-
den crime drop of the 1990s:  the decision to legalize abortion over a quarter century 
ago.”); Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?  
Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoffs, 58 STAN. L. REV. 703, 705 (2005) (arguing that 
statistical evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty, if it exists, may make 
the death penalty a moral imperative); Cass R. Sunstein & Justin Wolfers, Op-Ed., A 
Death Penalty Puzzle:  The Murky Evidence for and Against Deterrence, WASH. POST, June 30, 
2008, at A11 (calling for public debate on the death penalty to avoid distortions based 
on “misunderstanding . . . what the evidence actually shows”).   
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generate but also the analysis of other researchers.  If there are dif-
ferences of opinion regarding the outcomes of the experiment, the 
RIS should discuss reasons for the differences and explain why the 
agency prefers one conclusion about the causal effects of a policy 
over another. 
 
4.  An explanation of why the results weigh in favor of adopting a new 
policy.  The results of the experiment are simply data.  The results pro-
vide information that informs policymaking, but they cannot specify 
how policymakers should prefer certain outcomes over others.  Con-
sequently, the RIS should explain why the causal impacts of the policy 
are desirable in light of the stated goals of the agency. 
 
An important question would be the role of the courts in review-
ing RISs.  Once again, no doctrinal innovation is necessary here, as 
the courts could assess RISs with the usual tools of hard-look review, 
ensuring that agencies have carefully addressed counterarguments 
both to decisions about whether to engage in randomization and to 
decisions after experimentation occurs.  Creation of the RIS as an 
integral part of the administrative process would ensure that consid-
eration of randomization by both agencies and courts would become a 
standard part of the policy process, rather than an occasional innova-
tion pushed largely by academic researchers. 
The RIS could also provide an opportunity for the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB), or some other specialized agency, to 
generate expertise in administering experiments on which all agen-
cies could rely.  The OMB, or another specialized agency, might even 
be given the general task of conducting all policy experiments and 
interpreting results.  Running policy experiments requires specific 
skills, such as knowing what types of outcome information are readily 
obtainable and limiting dropout rates in the subject and control 
populations.  Many of these skills apply regardless of the subject of 
the policy experiment, and there is likely to be considerable learning 
by doing.  Just as pharmaceutical companies hire clinical trial com-
panies to run drug trials, so too should policymaking bodies use ex-
perimental-trial specialists.210 
 
210 One prominent clinical-trial company has run over “3,200 trials in some 90 coun-
tries” since 2000.  QUINTILES TRANSNATIONAL CORP., THE VALUE OF CONTRACT RE-
SEARCH ORGANIZATIONS 2, http://www.quintiles.com/elements/media/white-papers/ 
value-cros.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). 
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2.  Legislatures:  The Case for Self-Execution 
Given the problems identified in Part III, random-experimentation 
data will rarely give unambiguous answers to multidimensional policy 
questions.  The results of random experimentation will become addi-
tional pieces of information available to decisionmakers, and there is 
little reason to expect that the influence of information will be propor-
tional to its quality.211  But experiments could have greater impact if leg-
islatures were to make policy conditional on experimental results—that 
is, if experiments were self-executing.  A self-executing experiment ei-
ther could specify ex ante the policy effects of particular results, or, as 
in the Medicare experiment, could require independent decisionmak-
ers in an administrative agency to make policy changes based on the 
experiment.  The hope is to nudge policy at least a small distance in 
what will generally be the right direction while avoiding some of the 
public choice hurdles and legislative inertia that often frustrate change. 
A self-executing experiment, of course, would still require legisla-
tive authorization, and it therefore cannot avoid these obstacles alto-
gether.  But if through gradual steps randomized self-executing expe-
riments become sufficiently familiar that they no longer seem strange, 
then a culture of random legal experimentation might slowly emerge.  
Legal experiments should be easier to enact in this culture than are 
legal reforms in our present legal culture.  A marginal decisionmaker, 
uncertain whether to support a program, should be more willing to 
favor it when the program will continue if and only if it turns out to be 
successful.  Supporters of a program, meanwhile, may find it difficult 
to oppose a measure that would condition continuation of the pro-
gram on confirmation of its success.  Even a law’s staunchest oppo-
nents might nonetheless be willing to support the experiment if they 
believe that the experiment will prove the law to be a failure. 
These effects may be sufficient to promote experimentation on 
the margins even in today’s legal culture, but in a mature legal expe-
rimental culture, norms could emerge that could further facilitate ex-
perimentation and legal change.  We can imagine, for example, a bi-
directional self-executing experiment, which would move the law 
automatically in the direction of the experiment if it proves the law to 
be successful, and in the opposite direction if it proves the law to be a 
failure.  If ideological opponents genuinely disagree about the effects 
of potential policies, such experiments can seem beneficial ex ante, 
 
211 See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text (discussing an example of policy-
makers misunderstanding certain data). 
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increasing the gains from political trade.  Such experiments also 
channel ideological disagreement, increasing the possibility of legal 
change, rather than obstruction.  Finally, while these experiments 
seem unlikely in our current legal system, increased comfort with ex-
perimentation, randomization, and self-execution might someday 
create a public that perceives opposition to experiments as an indica-
tion that policymakers lack confidence in the empirical validity of 
their proposals. 
The principal challenge of self-execution is determination of what 
counts as success.  The metrics upon which policymakers agree may 
well be simple proxies—far less sophisticated than what statisticians 
would rely on ex post.  For example, success might depend on a com-
parison of a single variable, or perhaps two or three variables, between 
the treatment and control group.  In theory, policymakers might 
agree in advance on regression designs and a formula aggregating re-
gression coefficients or other results to create nuanced self-executing 
experiments.  But it is difficult to conceive in advance all of the re-
gression tests that would be necessary to verify robustness.  Any formu-
la is likely to be somewhat arbitrary and difficult to understand.  Even 
if social scientists might feel more comfortable scrutinizing many non-
random experiments than blindly following an ex ante specification of 
a measurement to be taken from a random experiment, relying on 
simple proxies for determining the success of randomized self-
executing experiments may be politically more feasible. 
Self-executing experiments will resolve policy debates based on 
simplified proxies for policy.  If a simplified experiment is likely to 
produce better policy than a more elaborate one, that should be suffi-
cient justification.  Policymakers have no moral obligation to increase 
the quantity of societal knowledge at the expense of policy.  Admittedly, 
if the proxy ex ante seems likely to be so poor that policy will effective-
ly be moving in a random direction, then the case for self-execution is 
weak.  Similarly, if the policy process improves so that it more effec-
tively assimilates expert opinion, more complex experimental designs 
may be preferable.  Even so, self-execution could do little harm, shift-
ing the policy baseline but still permitting policymakers to make 
changes if subtle experimental results justified them. 
Ultimately, we cannot consider legal experiments solely as a social 
scientist might.  Rather, we must consider legal experimentation as a 
mechanism of the policymaking process, an imperfect device for con-
verting scientific knowledge into law.  Sometimes, the criteria of scien-
tific usefulness and legal practicality point in different directions.  An 
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experiment might be beneficial even if its results add little to social 
science knowledge; a simple randomization scheme may be beneficial 
even where econometricians would prefer a more elaborate treatment 
design; and an experiment might compare two legal approaches vary-
ing along a number of dimensions, even though this may make the re-
sults difficult to interpret.  In general, simple designs will be prefera-
ble to more complex and sophisticated ones when there is a danger 
either that the relevant officials will be unable to agree on the policy 
significance of a randomized experiment, or that, even if some au-
thoritative decisionmaker could reach a resolution, such a decision-
maker might be biased in favor of a particular policy preference. 
C.  Applications 
To demonstrate the generality of such experiments, in this Sec-
tion we develop policy-experiment applications to different fields of 
law and policy, focusing on some fields that have not been considered 
as candidates for randomized experimentation in the past.  We begin 
with a detailed examination of an actual randomized securities law 
experiment and propose extending the same approach to test the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  We then consider the possibility of a randomized 
test in the area of taxation. 
1.  Securities Law 
Securities law is ideally situated for randomized policy experi-
ments.  Much of securities law applies at a national level.  As a result, 
there is little interstate variation in securities law that scholars can ap-
ply to test different approaches to securities regulation.212  Moreover, 
 
212 The lack of interstate variation explains the intense empirical interest in the 
relatively infrequent change in securities law at the national level.  For example, the 
1930s, when modern securities law was first introduced, continues to constitute an ac-
tive area of research, as do the 1960s, when an expansion of the securities law regime 
to over-the-counter (OTC) stocks occurred.  See, e.g., Michael Greenstone et al., Man-
dated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 121 Q.J. ECON. 
399, 400 (2006) (noting that “the 1964 [Securities Acts] Amendments provide a com-
pelling setting for evaluating the consequences of mandatory disclosure regula-
tions”); Paul G. Mahoney, The Political Economy of the Securities Act of 1933, 30 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1, 1 (2001) (describing the 1933 Securities Act as “a severe testing ground for 
rent-seeking theories of economic regulation”); Allen Ferrell, Mandated Disclosure and 
Stock Returns:  Evidence from the Over-the-Counter Market 6-33 (Harvard John M. Olin 
Center for Law, Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper No. 453, 2003), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=500123 (using the 1964 Amendments to study the effect 
of imposing mandated disclosure on the informational efficiency of the OTC market). 
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many topics in securities regulation, such as the desirability of short 
selling or the appropriate degree of required disclosure, are the sub-
ject of long-standing, but still hotly contested, debates.213  Securities 
regulation is characterized by intense theoretical debates informed by 
scant empirical evidence.  Systematic randomized policy experiments 
offer the prospect of providing important new data to many of these 
traditional, theoretical debates. 
a.  A Short-Sale Experiment 
Policymakers recently have begun to grasp the potential of ran-
domized policy experiments for securities.  In 2004, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) issued Rule 202T of Regulation SHO, 
devising an experiment to test some restrictions on short sales.214  
Scholars have debated the effect of these restrictions.  Finance theory 
predicts that short-sale restrictions should reduce the volume of short 
selling, an effect that, in turn, should reduce the liquidity of a stock 
and potentially lead to less accurate pricing.215  Others argue that the 
restrictions help to prevent coordinated short-sellers—seeking to 
force the price of a stock down simply to purchase it at a low price—
from manipulating stock prices.216 
Rule 202T allowed the SEC to implement a “pilot program to ex-
amine the efficacy” of the short-sale restrictions.217  The pilot program 
exempted one-third of the stocks in the Russell 3000, an equity index, 
 
213 See, e.g., Stephen E. Christophe et al., Short-Selling Prior to Earnings Announce-
ments, 59 J. FIN. 1845, 1847 (2004) (“[R]egulators should consider requiring markets to 
make more extensive and timely disclosures of short-selling activity.”); Ian Ramsay, 
Short Selling:  Further Issues, 21 SEC. REG. L.J. 214, 218 (1993) (arguing that a short-
selling disclosure rule could “impede market efficiency” and may not operate quickly 
enough to allow information to “disseminate into the market”). 
214 Short Sales, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,008, 48,012 (Aug. 6, 2004); see also Regulation of 
Short Sales, 17 C.F.R. § 242.200–.204 (2010); OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, U.S. SEC. & 
EXCH. COMM’N, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE SHORT SALE PRICE RESTRICTIONS UNDER 
THE REGULATION SHO PILOT 3-4 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ 
studies/2007/regshopilot020607.pdf (describing the restrictions in place before Rule 
202T was enacted and the purpose of the rule itself). 
215 See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 214, at 6-8 (“Finance theory predicts 
that under certain conditions, constraints on short selling may cause securities to be 
misvalued by the market, particularly when investors have highly divergent opinions 
about the stock.”). 
216 See Emilios Avgouleas, A New Framework for the Global Regulation of Short Sales:  
Why Prohibition Is Inefficient and Disclosure Insufficient, 115 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 376, 380-
83 (2010) (describing and countering the market-abuse argument offered by the gov-
ernment for short-selling restrictions).  
217 Id. at 4.  
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from the short-sale restrictions.218  The exempted stocks were chosen 
“by sorting the 2004 Russell 3000 first by listing market [e.g., NYSE, 
NASDAQ] and then by average daily dollar volume from June 2003 
through May 2004, and then within each listing market selecting every 
third company starting with the second.”219  This is an example of stra-
tified sampling.220  So long as it is effectively random which of the 
three companies with similar daily trading volumes happens to get ex-
empted from the restrictions, the selection mechanism is equivalent to 
a stratified randomized experiment.  Note that the SEC’s experimen-
tal design in this case did not seek volunteer companies for different 
regimes.  Instead, the SEC simply chose some companies that would 
be exempted from the current short-sale restrictions. 
The exempted stocks and the other stocks in the Russell 3000 op-
erated under different trading regimes from May 2005 to August 
2007, providing a significant period for observing the effects of the 
short-sale restrictions relative to eliminating the restrictions.221  The 
Office of Economic Analysis of the SEC produced a comprehensive 
report on the pilot program, including many of the components that 
we recommend for the RIS.  The report first reviews the theoretical 
and empirical literature on short-sale restrictions.222  This literature 
tends to view the existing policy of short-sale restrictions as ineffi-
 
218 Id. 
219 Id. n.6. 
220 Stratified sampling occurs because 
[i]n any randomized trial it is desirable that the comparison groups should be 
as similar as possible as regards participant characteristics that might influ-
ence the response to the intervention.  Stratified randomization is used to en-
sure that equal numbers of participants with a characteristic thought to affect 
prognosis or response to the intervention will be allocated to each compari-
son group. . . . Stratified randomization is performed either by performing 
separate randomization (often using random permuted blocks) for each strata, 
or by using minimization. 
Evidence-Based Medicine, SA HEALTHINFO, http://www.sahealthinfo.org/evidence/s.htm 
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  If trading volume influences the effect of short-sale restric-
tions, then the pilot design insured that the exempt group of stocks and the control 
group were similar by performing separate selections for each group of three stocks 
with similar daily trading volumes. 
221 See OFFICE OF ECON. ANALYSIS, supra note 214, at 4 (“The Pilot went into effect 
on May 2, 2005, and was scheduled to end on April 28, 2005, but [was] extended to 
August 6, 2007, to allow the Commission to consider potential rulemaking after eva-
luating the results of the Pilot.” (footnote omitted)). 
222 Id. at 16-22. 
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cient.223  The report explains that the pilot program was enacted “to 
obtain empirical data to help assess whether short sale regulation 
should be removed, in part or in whole, for actively-traded securities, 
or if retained, should be applied to additional securities.”224  The re-
port also provides detailed descriptions of the possible effects of short-
sale restrictions on a wide variety of outcomes, such as short-selling  
volume, the amount of “synthetic” short sales in the option markets or 
via trading platforms, liquidity, pricing levels, and pricing volatility.225 
The report then explains how the experiment was conducted, 
with a discussion and justification of the stratified sampling method 
used in the experiment.226  In addition, the report explains the me-
thodological tools applied to examine the impact of the short-sale re-
strictions on various outcomes.227  Finally, the report examines the im-
pact of the short-sale restrictions on the outcomes of interest—
including short-selling volumes, bid-ask spreads, and use of short-sale 
substitutes, such as put options.228  The report examines each outcome 
variable of interest and finds that eliminating short-sale restrictions af-
fects some outcome variables (such as short-selling volumes, which are 
approximately eight percent less with the restrictions than without) 
but has no effect on others (there are no differences in bid-ask 
spreads with or without the restrictions).229  The report also describes 
other studies of the pilot program’s experimental elimination of 
short-sale requirements and discusses differences in estimated effects 
between the SEC’s study and the other academic studies.230  The re-
port concludes, 
 In summary, having examined the impact of the Regulation SHO Pi-
lot on a wide array of market characteristics, we conclude that price re-
strictions constitute an economically relevant constraint on short selling.  
Our evidence suggests that removing price restrictions for the pilot 
stocks has had an effect on the mechanics of short selling, order routing 
 
223 See id. at 22 (“Overall, this evidence seems to indicate that tick tests can lead to 
narrower bid ask spreads, but impedes price discovery, while the bid tests should not 
have any discernible effect on market quality.”). 
224 Id. at 4 (quoting Order Suspending the Operation of Short Sale Price Provi-
sions for Designated Securities and Time Periods, Exchange Act Release No. 50,104, 69 
Fed. Reg. 48,032, 48,032 (Aug. 6, 2004)).  
225 Id. at 6-9. 
226 Id. at 22-27. 
227 Id. at 28-34. 
228 Id. at 34-51. 
229 Id. at 51-57; see also id. at 62 tbl.3, 65 tbl.6.   
230 Id. app. A.  
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decisions, displayed depth, and intraday volatility, but on balance has not 
had a deleterious impact on market quality or liquidity.
231
  
The report does not go beyond these conclusions to suggest policy 
changes in response to the experiment, although any subsequent at-
tempt to change short-sale restrictions is likely to discuss the pilot 
program in detail. 
In total, the nearly randomized elimination of short-sale restric-
tions for one-third of the firms in the Russell 3000 highlights the value 
of experiments for policymaking.  The experiment demonstrated that 
short-sale restrictions have some effects in the predicted direction, 
such as a reduction in short-selling volume, but that it is unlikely that 
elimination of the restrictions would have a dramatic effect on market 
efficiency.  Such sober conclusions suggest that experiments do not 
always lead to dramatic outcomes.  On the one hand, advocates of re-
peal can argue that the short-sale restrictions reduce freedom without 
producing any demonstrable improvement in market efficiency.  In-
creasing individual freedom without hurting others presents a strong 
case for repeal.  On the other hand, advocates of the status quo can 
argue that some of the benefits of the restriction—particularly the 
possibility of stabilizing the market during a price meltdown—were 
not amenable to easy testing.  Moreover, the costs of the restrictions 
are small.  The restriction has no systematic effect on bid-ask spreads.  
With relatively low costs and untested benefits, proponents of the 
short-sale restriction can argue that the case for repeal has not been 
made.  At a minimum, the existence of the randomized test results 
makes some of the more strident arguments for and against repeal of 
the short-selling restrictions less plausible. 
The quality of the experimental short-sale restriction elimination 
and its accompanying report raises an obvious question.  Given how 
valuable the experiment appears to be and how efficiently it was con-
ducted, why does the SEC not apply its experimental expertise syste-
matically to other debates in securities regulation?  The next subsec-
tion proposes such an experiment in one area—the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act—but experiments can apply to any controversial issue. 
b.  Experimental Sarbanes-Oxley Repeal 
In the wake of the Enron and WorldCom accounting scandals in 
2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.232  Sarbanes-Oxley in-
 
231 Id. at 56. 
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cluded many provisions to improve the quality of financial reporting 
and corporate governance.  Some of Sarbanes-Oxley’s prominent pro-
visions include mandatory CEO and CFO certification of financial re-
sults233 and new “internal-controls” requirements.234 
Sarbanes-Oxley has proven controversial.  Many corporations and 
academics dispute Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy in preventing fraud, while 
bemoaning its expense.235  Others argue that Sarbanes-Oxley performs 
a critical role in improving confidence in financial markets.236  This 
debate has spawned an extensive empirical literature evaluating Sar-
banes-Oxley’s impact on corporate value, cross-listing in the U.S. mar-
kets, and going-private decisions.237  Many empirical papers find that 
Sarbanes-Oxley appears to destroy value or reduce cross-listings, but 
others dispute these findings.238 
The ambiguity about Sarbanes-Oxley’s desirability is reflected in 
calls for its elimination.239  To this point, however, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
proponents have managed to prevent its alteration.  Sarbanes-Oxley, 
then, offers an almost ideal context for a randomized repeal of securi-
ties legislation.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions may well destroy value, 
 
232 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C.). 
233 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (2006). 
234 15 U.S.C. § 7262.  The internal-controls requirements obligated companies to 
set up elaborate mechanisms for detecting malfeasance within the company or disclose 
the absence of such controls.  
235 See, e.g., Peter C. Kostant, From Lapdog to Watchdog:  Sarbanes-Oxley Section 307 
and a New Role for Corporate Lawyers, 52 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 535, 536 n.2 (2008) (collect-
ing sources criticizing the Act). 
236 See id. at 536-37 (defending, in particular, section 307). 
237 See, e.g., Ellen Engel et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Firms’ Going-Private Deci-
sions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 116, 143 (2007) (“[S]maller firms with high inside owner-
ship experience higher going-private announcement returns in the post-SOX period 
compared to the pre-SOX period.”); Peter Iliev, The Effect of SOX Section 404:  Costs, 
Earnings Quality, and Stock Prices, 65 J. FIN. 1163, 1193 (2010) (finding that for small 
firms the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 outweighs the benefits); Roberta Romano, 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 
1529 (2005) (arguing for the removal of mandatory corporate governance provisions 
from Sarbanes-Oxley); Ivy Xiying Zhang, Economic Consequences of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 74, 110 (2007) (“[T]he cumulative abnormal returns of 
U.S. firms and foreign firms complying with SOX around key SOX events are negative 
and statistically significant.”). 
238 See generally Christian Leuz, Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 Really this Costly?  A 
Discussion of Evidence from Event Returns and Going-Private Decisions, 44 J. ACCT. & ECON. 
146 (2007) (discussing and contributing to this academic debate). 
239 See Romano, supra note 237, at 1529 (arguing that “the corporate governance 
provisions of SOX should be stripped of their mandatory force and rendered option-
al for registrants”).  
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but the existing empirical evidence is difficult to interpret because of 
confounding factors that plague the studies.  For example, foreign 
company cross-listings in U.S. markets may have declined because of 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s onerous requirements, or they may have declined 
due to the development of sophisticated foreign exchanges, decreas-
ing the value of U.S. markets as a source of capital.  An experimental 
repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley for some companies is likely to provide con-
vincing empirical evidence that resolves which of these factors is more 
important.  Moreover, because Sarbanes-Oxley is so unpopular with 
corporations, instituting an experimental repeal should prove popu-
lar, while avoiding the political battle that attempting to repeal Sar-
banes-Oxley permanently for all companies would cause. 
Randomized experimental repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley should take 
place as follows.  First, the most controversial provisions of Sarbanes-
Oxley should be identified.  These are likely to include the internal-
control provisions and the CEO and CFO certification provisions.  
These provisions should then be randomly repealed for some corpo-
rations.  The randomization should be stratified to ensure that differ-
ent types of companies are appropriately represented in both the 
treatment group (with the Sarbanes-Oxley restrictions repealed) and 
the control group (with Sarbanes-Oxley continuing as presently).  For 
example, foreign companies cross-listed in U.S. markets should be 
well represented in both the sample and the control group to help 
evaluate Sarbanes-Oxley’s effect on delisting from U.S. markets. 
The experimental repeal period should be relatively long.  Many 
of Sarbanes-Oxley’s effects will be felt only gradually.  Corporate 
fraud, for example, does not occur overnight.  In addition, once a 
plan for internal controls has been disbanded, it requires significant 
time and expense to restart it.  In response, companies subject to ex-
perimental repeal will not scrap or revise their costly internal-control 
mechanisms unless they can be confident that they will not have to 
reinstate the mechanisms shortly thereafter.  As a result, a short-term 
experimental Sarbanes-Oxley repeal will not provide a good test of 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s true effects.240  Instead, the experimental repeal 
should be applied for an extended period—up to several years.241 
 
240 Because market values incorporate expectations of future profits, market values 
respond very quickly to new policies.  The magnitude of the response to a new policy, 
however, will depend upon the policy’s duration, as well as the policy’s expected im-
pact.  A short-term experimental repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley may therefore have a small 
(and potentially indistinguishable) effect on corporate value because the experiment 
will not take place over a long enough period to have an important effect on long-term 
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Just as in the short-sale experiment, the unit of observation for an 
experimental Sarbanes-Oxley repeal should be the publicly traded 
company.  Sarbanes-Oxley’s requirements apply to publicly traded 
corporations, making the choice of unit of observation relatively 
straightforward.  If the repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley is likely to produce 
substantial competitive advantages for untreated firms (that is, those 
still subject to Sarbanes-Oxley requirements), then the unit of random-
ization may need to be raised to the industry level.242  Even the possibil-
ity of being put at a competitive disadvantage might make industry 
randomization politically more palatable. 
The randomization should occur on each controversial issue with-
in Sarbanes-Oxley, rather than on Sarbanes-Oxley as a whole.  Thus, 
some companies would have the internal-control provisions eliminat-
ed, but other provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley would remain intact.  Oth-
ers would have only the CEO and CFO certification provisions elimi-
nated.  Still others would have both these provisions eliminated but 
the rest of Sarbanes-Oxley intact, and so on.  Randomizing different 
permutations of the controversial provisions in Sarbanes-Oxley allows 
for the identification of specific provisions that are effective or ineffec-
tive, rather than attempting to judge the law as a whole.  In addition, 
observing the effects of different permutations allows policymakers to 
see if there are any interaction effects between the two provisions.243 
 
profitability.  Moreover, market responses, even if correct in expectation, may prove 
wrong in reality.  A longer-term experiment allows the researchers to determine actual 
effects, rather than simply anticipated effects.  
241 While several years may sound like a long period, the status quo, with a contro-
versial law applied indefinitely, is in many ways just as speculative an experiment, but 
one that does not produce information that would yield policy conclusions.   
242 For example, suppose that investors benefit from the improvement in informa-
tion quality mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley, but that investors can apply this information 
from companies subject to Sarbanes-Oxley to companies not subject to Sarbanes-
Oxley.  In this case, the non-Sarbanes-Oxley companies may do better than the Sar-
banes-Oxley companies because they get the benefit of the improved information 
without incurring its expense.  This difference in outcomes, however, does not accu-
rately estimate the effects of a full Sarbanes-Oxley repeal.  If no companies followed 
Sarbanes-Oxley, then there would be no informational spillovers, and all companies 
might be worse off.  An experiment that is partially randomized at the industry level 
and partially randomized at the firm level could parse out the extent to which there 
were intra-industry spillovers of this kind.   
243 An interaction effect occurs when the effect of one variable depends on the 
value of another variable.  For example, CEO-certification provisions taken alone 
might not impact corporate value.  Similarly, internal-control requirements taken 
alone may also have no impact on value.  When the two provisions are implemented 
together, however, they may have mutually reinforcing effects; the combination of the 
two provisions would then have an impact on value.  
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Because many companies find Sarbanes-Oxley compliance costly 
and are likely to volunteer, policymakers could ask for companies to 
volunteer to participate in a Sarbanes-Oxley-repeal experiment and 
then could assign some of these companies to a Sarbanes-Oxley-repeal 
treatment group and others to a control group with Sarbanes-Oxley 
remaining in place.244  The experiment with volunteer companies 
would provide a good estimate of the treatment effect of allowing 
companies to opt out of Sarbanes-Oxley because companies that volun-
teer to take part in an experimental repeal are likely to be similar to 
companies that would opt out of Sarbanes-Oxley were that an option.  
Examining an experiment with volunteers would provide a poor esti-
mate of the effect of a full repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley, however, because 
the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on companies that volunteer to have it 
eliminated is likely to be different from the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley 
on the average company.245 
To estimate the impact of a full Sarbanes-Oxley repeal on the av-
erage company, the repeal could be randomly, but mandatorily, as-
signed to some companies but not to others.  This method would in-
cur the cost of forcing some companies to experience Sarbanes-Oxley 
repeal unwillingly, but it would avoid the problem of estimating the 
impact of Sarbanes-Oxley exclusively for companies that volunteer to 
have it repealed.  A randomized mandatory repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley 
for some companies but not for others is no different than the ran-
domly assigned repeal of short-sale restrictions undertaken in the 
Regulation SHO pilot.  An intermediate strategy would be to random-
ize all companies except those that decide to opt out of the experi-
ment, ensuring that failure to act is not interpreted as unwillingness to 
participate in the experiment. 
 
244 Repealing Sarbanes-Oxley for all companies that volunteer for the Sarbanes-
Oxley-repeal experiment and estimating the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley by comparing 
these companies with companies that did not volunteer for the experiment (for whom 
Sarbanes-Oxley remained in place) fails to provide accurate estimates of the impact of 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  Companies that volunteer for Sarbanes-Oxley repeal may be different 
in unobservable ways from companies that do not volunteer.  Any differences in out-
comes for the two groups may therefore be attributable to these unobserved differenc-
es rather than to the repeal of Sarbanes-Oxley.  As a result, some companies that vol-
unteer for Sarbanes-Oxley repeal should be randomly assigned to a control group that 
must remain compliant with Sarbanes-Oxley.  These companies will be similar to the 
companies that volunteered for a Sarbanes-Oxley repeal and were randomly assigned 
to the group that no longer was required to remain compliant, making estimates of the 
effect of a Sarbanes-Oxley repeal more accurate. 
245 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (providing an analytical background 
for experiments conducted on self-selecting groups). 
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There are many potential outcomes of interest for a Sarbanes-
Oxley randomized experiment.  Sarbanes-Oxley aimed to restore in-
vestor confidence in the financial markets and financial reporting.  
Therefore, one obvious outcome variable is investor confidence in the 
quality of corporate reporting.  A related measure would include the 
incidence of fraud in Sarbanes-Oxley companies relative to non-
Sarbanes-Oxley companies.  To financial economists, however, confi-
dence and prevention of fraud are not aims but rather means to an 
end.246  Investor confidence should reduce the cost of equity and debt 
financing, thereby enabling more investment in positive net-present-
value activities.  Moreover, measures of investor confidence or fraud 
prevention fail to account for the cost of Sarbanes-Oxley compliance.  
Therefore, other measures that account for both the costs and bene-
fits of Sarbanes-Oxley should be examined. 
One important alternative measure of Sarbanes-Oxley’s efficacy is 
stock market value.  Stock market value goes up if investors perceive 
that Sarbanes-Oxley reduces the cost of capital without costing any-
thing itself, but it goes down if Sarbanes-Oxley raises costs without 
benefits.  The stock market response to the announcement of the 
randomization status of each company will therefore provide a good 
estimate of the market’s impression of Sarbanes-Oxley’s net effects.  
Because of the randomized nature of a Sarbanes-Oxley experiment 
and the large number of companies that would participate, a long-
term study of the impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on market value is possi-
ble.  Such a study would provide evidence not just of the market’s im-
pressions of Sarbanes-Oxley, but also of the market’s verdict after ob-
serving Sarbanes-Oxley’s impacts.  If, after a number of years, 
Sarbanes-Oxley companies have outperformed non-Sarbanes-Oxley 
companies, then this result would constitute solid evidence that Sar-
banes-Oxley enhances corporate value. 
If a Sarbanes-Oxley experiment is to be self-executing, simple 
comparisons of stock market values for treated and control corpora-
tions may be the best basis for determining whether Congress should 
retain particular features of Sarbanes-Oxley.  The case for self-
execution is particularly strong if it appears likely that Congress other-
wise might ignore the experiment, with partisans sticking to their orig-
 
246 See Irwin H. Steinhorn & William M. Lewis, Corporate Compliance Under the Regu-
lations Implementing Sarbanes-Oxley, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 30, 30 (2006) (noting 
that “‘[t]he strength of the U.S. financial markets depends on investor confidence’” 
(quoting Disclosure Required by Sections 404, 406, and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002, Securities Act Release No. 8177, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5110 ( Jan. 31, 2003))).    
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inal positions regardless of the experiment’s results.  Even a perfect 
experiment can not resolve all questions about Sarbanes-Oxley.  For 
example, partisans might argue reasonably that the result could have 
been different if the experiment had lasted longer.  It might seem that 
an experiment’s imperfection furnishes an argument against self-
execution, on the ground that policy changes should depend on ex 
post expert analysis.  Arguably, though, imperfection furnishes an ar-
gument for self-execution, if a proxy result is still meaningful and legis-
lators seem likely to have “sticky priors.”247  An imperfect proxy may be 
more likely to produce beneficial legislative change than might careful 
analysis if legislators seem unlikely to be swayed by such analysis.  In any 
event, self-execution would merely change the policy baseline; Congress 
could still act based on a nuanced interpretation of the experiment. 
In addition to running tests on Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC could run 
analogous experiments that investigate other contentious issues in se-
curities law, such as whether mandatory disclosure or insider trading 
prohibitions enhance corporate value, or merely add costs.  Such ex-
periments should follow the format we suggest here for Sarbanes-
Oxley, which, in turn, is very similar to the experimental short-sale re-
striction study already run by the SEC. 
2.  Tax Law 
Few topics in public policy are as hotly debated as the impact of 
different tax rates on incentives to work.  Some economists argue that 
small changes in marginal tax rates can have large effects on work 
hours and entrepreneurship.  As a result, they claim that lowering 
marginal tax rates does not reduce government revenues as much as 
one might predict.248  Others argue that hours and entrepreneurship 
are not particularly sensitive to relatively small changes in marginal 
tax rates, meaning that government revenues will fall nearly propor-
 
247 For a discussion of “sticky priors,” see generally Lisa E. Bolton & Americus 
Reed II, Sticky Priors:  The Perseverance of Identity Effects on Judgment, 41 J. MARKETING RES. 
397 (2004). 
248 If a change in tax rates has no impact on behavior, then the revenue loss can 
be estimated by the decrease in the tax rate.  Most economists, however, think that a 
change in the tax rate has some effect on the supply of labor and entrepreneurship.  
Some economists even claim that lowering tax rates can increase revenue, but this 
claim is discredited.  See N. Gregory Mankiw, The Optimal Collection of Seigniorage:  Theory 
and Evidence, 20 J. MONETARY ECON. 327, 332 (2004) (suggesting that an increase in tax 
revenue is normally associated with higher taxes).  
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tionately to the amount of a tax decrease.249  These arguments are re-
hashed whenever the government considers raising or lowering  
taxes—in other words, almost annually.250 
Because tax rates change frequently, there is ample variation with 
which to study how the change in tax rates impacts labor supply and 
entrepreneurship.251  Unfortunately, these changes in rates are often 
correlated with many other changes, making it extremely difficult to 
draw firm conclusions about the response of labor supply to tax 
rates.252  For example, tax rates are often altered in response to 
changes in economic conditions.253  If economic behavior changes af-
ter rates change, the behavior changes may be attributable to the 
change in rates, or they may be attributable to the altered economic 
conditions that motivated the change in rates in the first place.  Such 
confounding factors help explain the lack of consensus about the true 
impact of taxes on labor supply incentives.254 
Randomized experimental manipulation of tax rates will not suffer 
from this complication.  If tax rates are randomized at the individual 
level, then individuals facing similar economic conditions will be sub-
ject to different tax rates.  If these individuals behave differently, then 
 
249 See Paul Krugman, The Laffer Test (Somewhat Wonkish),  THE CONSCIENCE OF A 
LIBERAL, N.Y.TIMES.COM BLOG (Aug. 10, 2010, 10:37 AM), http:// 
krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/08/10/the-laffer-test-somewhat-wonkish (explaining 
that even very high marginal tax rates are not likely to reduce work much, though they 
do increase incentives to evade taxes).  
250 See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Now President Faces Tax Cut Test:  Loss of Revenue Means 
Bush Needs to Slow Spending, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2001, at A5 (suggesting that a tax cut 
must be accompanied by a reduction in spending); David E. Rosenbaum, Name That 
Tune About Tax Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2003, at BU4 (reporting Congress’s Joint 
Committee on Taxation’s finding that the “revenue feedback” from proposed tax cuts 
would be approximately three to twenty-three percent of the cuts over ten years). 
251 See, e.g., Daniel J. Mitchell, Lowering Marginal Tax Rates:  The Key to Pro-Growth 
Tax Relief, BACKGROUNDER (Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.), May 22, 2001, at 
1, 5-7 (using the Kennedy tax cuts and the Reagan tax cuts to argue that lower taxes 
stimulate economic growth, leading to higher revenue). 
252 See Basil Dalamagas, The Effects of Tax Rate Changes on Output and Government Def-
icits, 10 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 97, 101 (2003) (concluding that the effects of lowering 
the tax rate vary based on “the kind of effective tax rates which fiscal authorities choose 
to decrease and the ratio of factor income tax rate to consumption tax rate”).  
253 See, e.g., David M. Herszenhorn, Bush and House in Accord for $150 Billion Stimu-
lus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2008, at A1 (describing the 2008 tax rebate passed to boost the 
ailing economy).  
254 Again, this conclusion is not meant to imply that there is no scholarly consen-
sus on the impact of taxes on labor supply.  The notion that tax cuts increase revenue, 
for example, would be rejected by the vast majority of serious scholars.  See supra notes 
248, 249, and accompanying text (discussing different theories on the relationship be-
tween tax revenues and tax rates).  
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the behavior differences are much more likely to be caused by the dif-
ferential tax rates rather than confounding factors.  Take, for exam-
ple, two individuals of similar educational backgrounds and work his-
tories who are subject to different marginal tax rates.  If the individual 
subject to a lower tax rate works many more hours than her counter-
part subject to a higher tax rate, then this observation provides com-
pelling evidence that high marginal tax rates significantly reduce la-
bor supply.  We therefore recommend a randomized experiment of 
marginal tax rates. 
The unit of observation in this experiment should be the individual 
or household.255  The critical outcome of interest in the tax debate is 
the impact of tax rates on labor supply and entrepreneurship.  These 
decisions are made at the individual or household level, meaning that 
individuals or households are the appropriate units of observation.256 
Imposing differential mandatory tax rates on similarly situated 
individuals might be controversial.  One response to such potential 
debate would be to make it explicit that the government is sponsor-
ing a lottery, the winners of which will receive a reduction in their tax 
rates.  Only individuals who filed a tax return in the prior year (or 
perhaps only those who timely filed) might be deemed eligible for 
the lottery.257  State-sponsored lotteries are common, and providing a 
prize for a fraction of those who meet a legal requirement might not 
seem objectionable.  Even if only 0.01% of taxpayers were selected 
for the lottery, such a group would provide a relatively representative 
sample of over 10,000 taxpayers. 
Alternatively, the government could randomly assign different 
mandatory marginal tax rates to individuals but then provide fixed 
lump sum transfers to those individuals who receive higher tax rates 
 
255 Note that by varying the unit of randomization between the individual and the 
household, policymakers can get a sense of the true effect of the “marriage penalty” 
and other important questions of tax policy.  For more information on the marriage 
penalty, see generally James Alm et al., Policy Watch:  The Marriage Penalty, 13 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 193 (1999).  
256 If policymakers want to study the spillover effects of taxes, such as whether bene-
fits associated with lower taxes on the rich “trickle down” to the lower and middle 
classes, then policymakers can examine the behavior of each wealthy individual in 
greater detail.  For example, if lower tax rates lead to greater entrepreneurship, then 
policymakers should examine the start-up businesses founded by those with lower tax 
rates and estimate the identities and salaries of employees of the start-up business.  If 
this exercise proves impossible, then tax rates can be randomized at other units of ob-
servation, such as the state or county.   
257 We credit Terrence Chorvat for the idea of a state-sponsored lottery for indi-
viduals who meet tax law requirements.   
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so that average tax rates remain similar across individuals.  There are 
several difficulties to this scheme, however.  There will remain some 
differences in treatment, as the true average tax rate will depend on 
individual labor supply decisions, and these decisions will be differen-
tially affected by different tax rates.  In addition, an experiment that 
randomly assigns marginal tax rates and lump-sum transfers does not 
provide unambiguous estimates of the impact of different marginal 
tax rates.  Instead, the experiment provides estimates of the effects of 
different marginal tax rates and offsetting transfers.  If transfers also 
have an effect on labor supply—such as a wealth effect258—then the 
experiment fails in its aim to provide conclusive evidence about the 
impact of marginal tax rates on labor supply and entrepreneurship. 
As with securities law experiments, a brief marginal tax rate expe-
riment is unlikely to provide an unbiased estimate of the effect of dif-
ferent marginal tax rates.259  If tax rates change for a brief time, indi-
viduals subject to low tax rates may shift work from future periods into 
the current period to take advantage of the lower tax rate.  If people 
do act in this fashion, the experiment will generate an unrealistically 
high estimate of the impact of tax rates on labor supply.  The experi-
ment will reflect employees’ abilities to shift work between time pe-
riods rather than to permanently adopt different labor arrangements 
in response to different incentives.  A longer experiment period limits 
the ability of individuals to shift work between periods.  One can easily 
move work from week to week, but it is much more difficult to move 
work from one year to another.  As a result, the taxation experiment 
should take place over a relatively long period of time (such as two to 
three years), and outcome variables should be measured for at least a 
year after the conclusion of the experimental manipulation. 
There are many outcome variables of interest for a randomized 
experimental study of different marginal tax rates.  The most obvious 
outcome variables are labor supply and wages.  The experiment we 
propose will directly address the degree to which lower taxes induce 
individuals to work more hours or seek more demanding, higher-wage 
jobs.  Other outcome variables, such as entrepreneurship levels, child-
 
258 Cf. Alan B. Krueger & Jörn-Steffen Pischke, The Effect of Social Security on Labor 
Supply:  A Cohort Analysis of the Notch Generation, 10 J. LABOR ECON. 412, 434 (1992) 
(concluding that previous estimates of the wealth effect of Social Security—i.e., of the 
extent to which the program’s benefits motivated people to exit the labor force—
were exaggerated).   
259 See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying text (discussing why the experimental 
period needs to be relatively long). 
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care decisions, and unemployment rates, should also be examined.  
One of these outcome variables, or some weighted combination of 
them, might be selected as the target of a self-executing experiment, 
in which the result would be either slightly lower or slightly higher 
taxes for the population at large.  This experiment may be particularly 
attractive if Democrats and Republicans on average have different 
empirical views about the effects of marginal tax rates.  A self-
executing experiment might leave each side optimistic that it will pre-
vail, and it may be the only way to effect change if the losing side can 
be expected to conjure some rationalization for the outcome instead 
of changing its view on taxes. 
3.  Civil Rights 
To this point, most of our examples of experiments have con-
cerned corporate or public finance.  But the idea of randomized test-
ing can be applied to a larger set of laws that more directly regulate 
individual behavior.  This subsection sketches how a randomized ex-
periment could inform legislative choice concerning civil rights.  At 
the moment, there is no federal law prohibiting employment discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual orientation.260  The Employment Non-
Discrimination Act of 2007 (ENDA)—a minimalist prohibition of dis-
parate treatment on the basis of sexual orientation—has been intro-
duced in Congress several times,261 and the House passed it in 2007,262 
but both chambers have yet to enact it.  Even though polls suggest 
that an overwhelming majority of Americans oppose employment dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation,263 opponents of ENDA 
 
260 Twenty-one states and the District of Columbia have passed state statutes that 
prohibit employers from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.  See State-
wide Employment Laws and Policies, HUMAN RIGHTS CAMPAIGN ( July 26, 2010), 
http://www.hrc.org/documents/Employment_Laws_and_Policies.pdf (listing the states). 
261 See, e.g., Employment Non-Discrimination Act of 2009, H.R. 3017, 111th Cong. 
(1st Sess. 2009). 
262 H.R. 3685, 110th Cong. (1st Sess. 2007). 
263 See THE GALLUP POLL:  PUBLIC OPINION 2004 (Alec M. Gallup & Frank Newport 
eds., 2006) (“Americans overwhelmingly support ‘equal rights in terms of job oppor-
tunities’ for gay men and women.”); Elizabeth Mehren, Acceptance of Gays Rises Among 
New Generation, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 11, 2004, at A1 (“72% favor laws to protect homosex-
uals from job discrimination . . . .”); John Newsome, Employment Non-Discrimination Act 
(ENDA) Vote Tests Our Values:  An Incrementalist Law Is a Blunder, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 7, 
2007, at B11 (“[A] 2006 Gallup Poll reveals that 89 percent of respondents favor equal 
opportunities for gay people.”); GAY & LESBIAN ALLIANCE AGAINST DEFFAMATION, ME-
DIA REFERENCE GUIDE 29 (8th ed. 2010), available at http://www.glaad.org/ 
document.doc?id=99 (noting that a 2005 Gallup poll showed 87% support for equal 
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argue that it would impose substantial litigation and other compliance 
costs on private employers.264 
A 2000 General Accounting Office (GAO) study sheds some light 
on the question of litigation costs by analyzing the number of claims 
that had been made in the twelve states, including the District of Co-
lumbia, that had prohibited sexual orientation discrimination by pri-
vate employers as a matter of state law.265  One of us analyzed the 
claims data, together with more general employment data, and found 
that historically there has been only about one claim each year for 
every 60,000 workers.266  If the employer’s average cost per complaint 
were $100,000, the average annual cost of the statute per employee 
would be less than $2.267 
While this analysis of historic data suggests that employer costs are 
low, these estimates might not fully represent the costs that a federal 
law would produce.  For example, it is possible that employers in the 
first twelve states to pass the law are less likely to discriminate than 
those in the remaining thirty-eight.  Or it might be possible that the 
specific language of ENDA would produce lower (or higher) costs of 
compliance than would similar state statutes.  A randomized test of 
the impact of ENDA is a natural and powerful way to learn more 
about whether opponents’ objections are well founded.  A rando-
mized control trial could produce valuable information on whether 
ENDA decreases the profitability or the stock price of firms.  We 
would learn about the litigation and compliance costs for a represent-
ative subsample of firms.  And we could even find out whether ENDA 
caused covered firms to lose market share to uncovered firms. 
 
job opportunities for “homosexuals” but 90% support for equal job opportunities 
for—using different language—“gays and lesbians”). 
264 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATE-
MENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY:  H.R. 3685—THE EMPLOYMENT NON-DISCRIMINATION 
ACT (2007) (stating the policy position of former President George W. Bush, who op-
posed ENDA on “constitutional and policy grounds”). 
265 See Letter from Barry R. Bedrick, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Accounting 
Office, to the Honorable James M. Jeffords, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., La-
bor and Pensions 2 (Apr. 28, 2000), available at http://archive.gao.gov/f0502/ 
575711.pdf (finding “no indication that these laws . . . generated a significant amount of 
litigation”).  The General Accounting Office became the Government Accountability Of-
fice in 2004. Our Name, U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, http://www.gao.gov/ 
about/namechange.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).  
266 Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination:  Privatizing 
ENDA with a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1670 (2006).  
267 Id. at 1671.  
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In this subsection, we discuss how such a test might be structured.  
Although it would theoretically be possible to assign the application 
of ENDA randomly to individual workers, the administrative costs for 
an employer to comply with a discrimination prohibition on part of 
its workforce would not produce a very accurate view of firm-level 
costs of compliance.  Thus, randomizing across firms would probably 
be the most effective approach.  Given the negligible costs implicit in 
the GAO data, the compliance costs are unlikely to be so great as to 
create a substantial competitive disadvantage.268  Firms assigned to the 
status quo control group (no prohibition of discrimination) might, 
however, be affected by the treatment group if employees are trans-
ferred to or from the treatment group because of the discrimination 
prohibition.  If this type of overflow effect is large enough, it might 
militate for randomizing at the industry level—or conducting a 
mixed experiment that randomizes partially at the industry level and 
partially at the firm level.269 
It is also necessary to determine what proportion of firms would 
be assigned to comply with ENDA.  There are so many firms in the 
United States—more than six million businesses with employees270—
that it would be possible to perform a powerful test that assigns per-
haps one percent to the covered or uncovered arm of the experiment.  
The test might initially run for three to five years to give the firms and 
the employees time to learn about and adjust to the requirement. 
A more libertarian version of the test would merely assign different 
ENDA defaults to different firms.  Federal law currently allows employ-
ers to intentionally discriminate on the basis of employee sexual orien-
tation.  But this employer freedom to discriminate is nothing more than 
a default.  There is nothing to stop employers from opting into ENDA 
by private contract and giving their employees and applicants virtually 
identical rights, including private rights of action, as they would have if 
ENDA had passed.  Indeed, Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda Brown have 
created a contractual mechanism where any employer can do just that 
 
268 By comparing relative market shares of the covered and uncovered firms, ana-
lysts can test for any impact on competition. 
269 Alternatively, the possible overflow effects of employees could be dampened by 
randomizing across cities or states.  But the plausible size of this impact would not jus-
tify reducing the number of observations. 
270 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,  NUMBER OF FIRMS, NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS, EMPLOY-
MENT, ANNUAL PAYROLL, AND ESTIMATED RECEIPTS BY ENTERPRISE EMPLOYMENT SIZE FOR 
THE UNITED STATES AND STATES, TOTALS: 2007, available at http://www2.census.gov/ 
econ/susb/data/2007/us_state_totals_2007.xls (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (reporting 
6,049,655 U.S. firms in 2007).   
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with a few clicks at www.fairemploymentmark.org.271  In this agreement, 
employers gain the right to use a certification mark if they promise not 
to discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.  The certification 
mark gives employers a private contract route to effectively opt into the 
statute’s coverage.  But Congress could take the fair employment idea 
further by giving firms an explicit right to affirmatively “opt into” ENDA 
coverage.272 
The fight over civil rights legislation to date has exclusively 
sounded in terms of mandatory rules.  But recent empirical research 
in behavioral economics suggests that defaults and menus matter, 
even at the firm-wide level.273  Instead of running an experiment on 
the effects of mandatory ENDA, it is possible to test the impact of vary-
ing the default or menu dimensions of the law.  Specifically, we could 
randomize firms into three groups:  a control group with the status 
quo federal coverage, an “opt in” group of firms that can affirmatively 
opt for coverage by sending a notice to the Justice Department, and 
an “opt out” group of firms that can avoid liability under the statute by 
sending notice (in advance of any claimed discrimination) to the Jus-
tice Department that they do not wish to be covered.274 
 
271 Ayres and Brown advocated for the contractual mechanism of the Fair Em-
ployment Mark as a means to replicate ENDA in the private context.  See generally Ian 
Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Privatizing Employment Protections, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 587 
(2007).  The fair employment license, however, falls short of ENDA protections on a 
few dimensions.  See Ayres & Brown, supra note 266, at 1655 (noting that the license 
would not be enforced by governmental agencies, and private suits could not be 
brought in federal court). 
272 Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 8 (2006). 
273 See Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do?  An Empirical Ex-
amination 40 (Yale Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for Studies in Law, Econ., & Pub. Policy, 
Research Paper No. 335, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=924578 (“The 
presence or absence of corporate menus leads to large differences in outcomes, as do 
differences in default rules.”).  
274 Randomized tests of default rules and menu options do pose particular prob-
lems for maintaining an uncontaminated control group similar to those described in 
Part III.  It is possible that the treatment will impact the control group’s behavior.  For 
example, control-group firms may be confused about the legal regime under which 
they operate, or the existence of the treatment group might by itself increase the sa-
lience of the issue and put pressure on control-group firms to contract for substitutes 
for the treatment (such as the Fair Employment Mark).  The availability of close substi-
tutes for the treatment can bias (toward zero) the estimated impacts of the treatment.  
See James Heckman et al., Substitution and Dropout Bias in Social Experiments:  A Study of 
an Influential Social Experiment, 115 Q. J. ECON. 651, 655 (2000) (“When good substi-
tutes for an evaluated program are available, the effect of the program will be small 
even if the effect of training is large.”).  
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CONCLUSION 
Randomized experimentation offers a powerful means to evaluate 
the effects of proposed policies.  By applying laws and policies to dif-
ferent groups on a random basis, the causal impacts of the law can be 
isolated from other factors that would ordinarily be correlated with 
exposure to different policies.  It is therefore not surprising that ran-
domized controlled experiments have become increasingly prevalent 
in evaluating the impacts of different laws and policies.  Legislators 
enact the vast majority of policy changes, however, without the benefit 
of randomized evaluations.  This Article seeks to systematize and ex-
pand the use of randomized experiments in law and policy.  In the 
short term, a number of individual experiments could advance the use 
of randomization and improve policy.  In the long term, administra-
tive agencies might be required to file randomization impact state-
ments with all new regulations.  Meanwhile, a norm in favor of exper-
imental evidence can encourage legislators to back up their empirical 
claims with a willingness to initiate experiments through legislation, 
making policy outcomes dependent on experimental results. 
 
